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Eisangelia and Euthyna: the Trials of
Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon
Edwin M. Carawan

P

at Athens in the early fifth century are known to
us only from brief references, but much of the reconstruction of
Athenian constitutional history, from Cleisthenes to Ephialtes,
depends upon the interpretation of these procedures. According to the
atthidographic tradition in the Athenaion Politeia, the Areopagus controlled impeachments for major offenses (eisangeliai), as well as the
accountings of public officials (euthynai), until Ephialtes' reforms; but
other references clearly indicate that the demos had already assumed
authority in trials for treason and conspiracy and in prosecutions for
official misconduct, including the trials of Miltiades, Themistocles,
and Cimon. 1 In recent work M. H. Hansen has concluded that eisangeliai of the pre-Ephialtic period were tried before the ekklesia or
the court of the people, and in these trials the Areopagus had no officialjurisdiction; P. J. Rhodes has argued that sovereignty in eisangeliai belonged to the Areopagus until Ephialtes conferred these powers
upon the people, and has suggested that the partisan verdicts of the
Areopagus in the trials of Themistocles and Cimon helped to provoke
democratic reform. 2 Without decisive evidence for the earlier proceedings, the debate has focused upon the nomos eisangeltikos and
political trials after 461, but there is still no consensus on the rules of
jurisdiction in classical eisangelia and very little agreement on the
origin of these rules. In regard to euthynai of the later fifth and fourth
centuries, Marcel Pierart has contributed an important study, but its
OLITICAL TRIALS

IOn the demos and the Areopagus in early eisangelia see J. H. LIPSIUS, Das attische
Recht und Rechtsverfahren (Leipzig 1905-15 [hereafter 'Lipsius')) I 176-87, esp. 17881, on the trials of Miltiades and Themistocles; G. BUSOLT and H. SWOBODA, Griechische Staatskunde (Munich 1926 ['BusoltlSwoboda']) II 846-52, 1005-09; and for
the traditional view of Areopagite sovereignty, C. HIGNETT, A History o/the Athenian
Constitution (Oxford 1952 ['Hignett')) 146-48, 193-213.
2 P. J. RHODES, The Athenian Boule (Oxford 1972 [hereafter 'Rhodes')) 199-211,
argued that the Areopagus controlled these procedures until the transfer of jurisdiction to the Council of Five Hundred. M. H. HANSEN, Eisangelia (Odense 1975
['Hansen']), argued that the demos controlled impeachments. Rhodes took issue with
Hansen's arguments on early eisangeliai and the nomos eisangeltikos in JHS 99
(1979) 103-14; Hansen responded in JHS 100 (1980) 89-95.
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implications for pre-Ephialtic procedure have not been fully considered;3 and the conclusions and contradictions of recent work call for a
new reconstruction of impeachments and accountings before Ephialtes' 'revolution' to reassess the authority of the demos and the powers
of the Areopagus.
As the evidence requires, this study is divided into two major sections, dealing first with legal principles and then with specific cases:
we shall need to reconsider the conclusions that have been drawn
from classical procedure and the later tradition before we examine the
testimonia concerning major political trials in the crucial era of constitutional change. Most of the ancient references to the 'Areopagite
regime' and democratic reform derive from fourth-century sources,
and they should be judged in the light of contemporary procedure. We
are, for example, told twice in the Politics (1274a15, 1281b31) that
the demos controlled accountings under the Solonian constitution,
but it is unlikely that the assembly was any more directly involved in
euthynai of the sixth and fifth centuries than in Aristotle's own day.
To understand such evidence it will be necessary to distinguish the
competent authorities at each stage of proceedings, from preliminary
investigation to final verdict. It is often observed that cases described
in our sources as eisangeliai or euthynai could be initiated by several
procedures involving different pre-judicial authorities, and our
sources sometimes suggest that these divisions of jurisdiction developed from pre-Ephialtic procedure. Thus in the first section, in order
to re-define classical rules of jurisdiction and pre-Ephialtic precedent,
eisangelia to the assembly and proceedings before the council will be
treated under separate headings; in the second section, the trials of the
pre-Ephialtic period will be considered in detail.

I
(a) Eisangelia to the assembly:
"
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aVE V TOV u71fJ-0V TOV
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fJ-71, ,HvaL
avaTq> ':.71fJ-LwuaL

3 M. PIERART, "Les f:iJ8vIIOL atheniens," AntCI 40 (1971 [hereafter 'Pierart']) 526-73;
A. R. W. HARRISON, The Law of Athens (Oxford 1968-71 ['Harrison']) II 208-11; D.
M.MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Cornell 1978) 170-90. On the transfer of
jurisdiction, see esp. E. Ruschenbusch, "Ephialtes," Historia 15 (1966) 369-76, and
. Athenische Innenpolitik im fiinften Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Bamberg 1979) 57-65; R.
Sealey, "Ephialtes," in Essays in Greek History (Woodhaven [N.Y.] 1965) 42-58
(=CP 59 [1964] 11-22), and "Ephialtes, Eisangelia and the Council," in Classical
Contributions, Studies in Honor of Malcolm Francis McGregor (Locust Valley [N.Y.]
1981) 125-34; E. CARAWAN, "Apophasis and Eisangelia: the Role of the Areopagus in
Athenian Political Trials," GRBS 26 (1985 ['Carawan']) 115-40.
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The provisions of the nomos bouleutikos in IG P 105, including the
rule that the council pass no sentence of death without verdict of the
demos (36), constitute the only inscriptional evidence we have concerning the respective jurisdictions of council and assembly in eisangelia. This "tantalizing fragment" is generally agreed to be a republication of more ancient clauses of the bouleutic oath. 4 The law
implies that 'the council' had previously sentenced criminals to death
on its own authority, and that the council, from the date of the inscription (410/9), would continue to initiate proceedings involving the
death penalty, but such cases would come to trial before the assembly
or the court.s It is unlikely, however, that the Cleisthenic council of
five hundred ever held authority for execution without reference to
the people prior to the oligarchic revolutions of the late fifth century.
Rhodes suggested that this and similar restrictions were introduced
along with the reforms of Ephialtes, as a precaution that the council
not abuse its new powers as the Areopagus had done. It is also
possible that the restriction of the council's jurisdiction in classical
procedure derives from earlier restrictions on the powers of the Areopagus. Some guarantee of the people's authority in sentencing capital
cases is clearly indicated in the trials of Miltiades, Hipparchus, and
Themistocles. It has been difficult, however, to define the rules for
initiating procedures and hearings-in-chief, as well as for determining

4 The prohibition against the death penalty was earlier reconstructed from Ath.Pol.
45.1 as /J-~ EtvaL 8avaTovv (IG P 114.37); cf Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen II
(Berlin 1893) 195f; Lipsius I 45f. The account in Ath.Pol. 45.1 links this restriction
with the acquittal of Lysimachus after condemnation in the council, apparently soon
after the regime of the Thirty; but, as Rhodes has observed (Commentary on the
Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia [Oxford 1981]) 538, this connection "may have been
invented or misapplied to illustrate a fictitious reduction in the power of the boule."
If we omit the anecdote of Lysimachus, nicknamed 0 a'ITo TOV TV'lTaVOV, we get a more
credible account: ~ at- f30VA~ 'lTpOTEPOV /J-EV ~v Kvpla Kal xp~/J-aow C.,,/J-Lwcrat Kal MicraL Kal
,
, '" '\
Q
\
'
a'ITO/cTfLVaL
. ••• 0, uE\ UTJ/J-OS a.,..flI\ETO
T."S ,...OVI\TJS
TO\ 8auaTOVU /CaL\ uflU /CaL\
XPTJ/J-acrlV
...I'.TJ/J-LOVV,
~

~

~ ~

~

~

~

~

~

~

Kal VO/J-OV (8~TO, liv nvo~ a.aLK~'V ~ f3ovA~ KaTa')lv41 ~ C.,,/J-LWcr!1, TC:tS KaTa')lVwcrHs Kal TaS
hLC.,,/J-LWcrfLS EIcra')lElV TOt,S 8Ecr/J-08'Ta~ Els TO ~L/CacrTr/PLOV, /Cal Hn au
~LKacrTal "'.,,</>[croovTaL, TOUTO KVPLOV ~TvaL. For further provisions of the bouleutic oath, see Rhodes 194-

or

207.
5 The precise meaning of 0 aij/J-os 'lTA.,,8voov is still disputed. From this inscription
and Xen. Hell. 1.7.9, BusoltlSwoboda (987) assumed that a quorum of 6,000 was
sufficient to represent the body politic. Against the view that the dikasteria (whose
panels totaled 6,000) were regarded as judicial committees of the demos, Hansen,
GRBS 19 (1978) 142-46, asserted that the courts were separate and sovereign. The
phrase in IG P 105.36 may best be understood as requiring a decree of the assembly
in eisangeliai for capital offenses, whether tried before the assembly or the court. For
the political context of this clause of the bouleutic oath, see Rhodes 206. In the view
expressed here I am indebted to Martin Ostwald for his comments on the problem.
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which authorities conducted preliminary investigations and which
decided the question of guilt or innocence.
In classical procedure Hansen has observed a significant division of
jurisdiction governing preliminary hearing and trial: charges of treason, punishable by death or exile, were ordinarily initiated in the ekklesia and (down to 36110) many of those accused of treason were
tried and sentenced in the assembly: charges of official misconduct
punishable by fine, including ICAo'7T.q~ and p.~ xp.qu6aL TO'i~ vop.o,~, and
directed against magistrates (or citizens acting in an official capacity)
were ordinarily given a preliminary investigation in the council and
tried before the court. The analysis of these procedures is complicated
by the requirement for probouleusis, involving the council in cases
v'7Ta Tav a.qp.ov, and by the involvement of the assembly at a preliminary stage of the investigation in some eisangeliai to the council.
Although Hansen has assembled an impressive array of evidence,
Rhodes is not persuaded, and some of his objections must be taken
into account.
Against four "indisputable" instances of charges introduced in the
ekklesia (including the first accusation against Alcibiades and the trial
of the Arginusae generals [Hhnsen 25]), Rhodes (109) rightly objects
that we have no clear indication that the investigation was not begun
in the council and then submitted to the assembly for debate. Moreover the bouleutic oath clearly provides for preliminary investigation
in council before trial of capital offenses, such as conspiracy. But these
objections do not invalidate Hansen's analysis of official jurisdiction:
given the nature and urgency of the offenses in these cases, we must
allow for alternate means of introducing charges to avoid delay. In
some cases, evidence of major political offenses for which the assembly appears to have official jurisdiction may have been introduced in
the council, which then called a special session of the assembly. It is
also inevitable that in some instances accusations of official misconduct arose in the debate of other issues in the ekklesia or the court and
were then referred to the council for preliminary hearing. The decisive procedural criterion is the preliminary verdict (katagnosis or
katacheirotonia); from the evidence we have, it is a reasonable conclusion that the council gave judgment concerning official misconduct,
but the vote of the people was required in prosecutions for treason
and other political offenses punishable by death.
Concerning the official jurisdictions of the council and assembly,
Rhodes does not accept the conclusions that Hansen has drawn from
the orators and lexicographers-and again his caution is well taken.
In Harpocration's note on €Lua,),,),€Ala, Hansen (21-28) finds confirma-
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tion for his division of jurisdiction; but Rhodes has argued (JHS 99
[1979] 106-08) that there is no clear indication of a division between
cases heard before the council and those introduced 7rph~ Thv afjp.ov.
The structure of Harpocration's article in itself seems to support
Rhodes' objection: for each of three classes of eisangelia, the lexicog-

rapher defines first the nature ofthe charges, then the jurisdiction, and
finally the penalties for conviction or frivolous prosecution. In the
section on eisangeliai for major political offenses, the council and the
assembly are named as the competent authorities, in contrast to the
powers of the archon and the courts in lesser eisangeliai (not in order
to distinguish the respective jurisdictions of the council and the
people, as Hansen suggests):6
The first class of impeachments (a) concerns the highest crimes
against the state, which allow no delay, and (b) for which no magistracy holds jurisdiction . . . but the preliminary judgment is held
before the councilor the people, (c) for which the highest penalties
are prescribed for convictions but the prosecutor is exempt from
penalty unless he fails to win one-fifth of the votes [and in archaic
procedure failed prosecutions brought severer penalties]. 7

Rhodes further assumes (107) that "crimes ... for which no magistracy holds jurisdiction" refers to a second category of charges, l1.-ypatpa o17p.O(na aO'IC~p.aTa (cf. Poll. 8.51); but the pattern of Harpocration's
entry suggests that this phrase applies to the general heading, o17p.OtTLa
aaL/C~p.aTa p.'YLuTa. 8 The same outline, describing (a) the charges, (b)
6 Harpocration s. v. eisangelia (=Suda EI 222): Tpla a' €UT'V f~71 fluaYYfA&WV' (1) ~
p.€V yap (a) €'If' a71P.oulo,r; aa&/C~p.au, p.fyluTo,r; /Cal avafJoA~v p.~ €'lfLafXop.fvo,r;, (b) /Cal (f/l'
or~ p.~u apx~ /Ca8fuT71u p.~u vop.o, /Cf'VTa, TO'S l1.pxovu, /Ca8' oil~ fluayovu,v, aAAa 'lfpO~
T~V fJovA~v ~ TOV a~p'ov ~ 'lfpmT71 KaTauTau,~ ylvfTa" (c) /Cat €f/l' ors Tij> p.tv f/ln')yovTL, (av
aAij> p.fy,uTa, (71p.la, hlKovTa" ;, at aLmKwv, Uv p.~ fAY, OVafV (71p.LovTaL • •.• (2) hfpa at
fluaYYfAla AfYfTa, (a) ('If' Ta,~ /Ca/Cmufu,v, (b) a~Ta, a' flu, 'lfpO~ TOV l1.pxovTa, (c) /Ca, Tij>
aLm/Covn a'~p.,oL, /Cav p.~ p.fTaAafJTI TO f' p.fpor; TWV "'~f/lwv. (3) CZAA71 at EluaYYfAla (un (a)
/CaTa TWV aLaLT71Twv' fl yap TL~ V'lTO aLaLT71Tov aaLK718fl71, (b) ("fiv TOVTOV fluayY'AAfLV 'lfpOS
TOV~ aL/CauTas, (c) /Ca, aAOVS ?jnp.OVTo.

7 The bracketed phrase is inconsistent with what we know of penalties for failed
prosecutions in eisangeliai: only in the latter half of the fourth century were
prosecutors liable to a fine for failing to win one-fifth of the votes; earlier there was
no automatic penalty (cf. Hansen 29-31). The phrase was perhaps inspired by
probole, another remedy against false prosecution, discussed infra at nn.16-18.
8 It is not unlikely that the category /Ca,va /Ca, G.ypaf/la aaL/C~p.aTa is a gloss by CaecHius for "crimes . . . for which no magistracy holds jurisdiction," p.~u vop.o, /cE'VTaL
TO'S l1.pxovu" /cTA. Lex. Cant. s. v. fluaYYfAla explicitly contrasts that view with the
account in Theophrastus' Peri nomon (which appears to give an extended version of
the statute in Hyp. 3.8): fluayyfAla, /CaTa /CaLVWV /Ca, aypaf/lwv aaL/C71p.lhwv. at$T71 p.tv ov/c

~ Ka&/CLAlov ao,a' E>fo4JpauTo~ at €V Tij> uTapTC!' 'lffP' vop.wv 4J71Ut Yfvfu8aL €av ns /CaTaAt'J!1
TOV a~p'ov P~TWP ~ p.~ Ta G.pLuTa uvp.fJovAflJ!1 xp~p.aTa Aap.fJavwv, ~ Uv n~ 'lfpOaLaij> xw-
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the competent authority, and (c) the penalties, is followed in the secfori ELUaj'j'€I\La
'
'I.
'
'\ ICaTa TWV
~
~
~
SUC h
·
t Ions
ICaICWU€wS' an d ELUaj'j'€I\La
uLaLT"ITWV.
is the extent of Harpocration's precision in describing impeachment
procedures. There is no subdivision of the charges or of the authorities, and thus no clear reference to l1j'pacpa aaLIC~JJ.aTa, as opposed to
crimes defined by statute. The provision that "preliminary judgment
is held before the council or the people" cannot be taken as evidence
for separate jurisdictions for the assembly, in cases of treason, and for
the council, for official misconduct (as Hansen has deduced from the
cases known to us); it simply indicates that the ordinary magistratesthe archons, the thesmothetai, and others-had no authority. Harpocration groups all such offenses under the heading a"lJJ.ouLa aaLIC~JJ.aTa
JJ.EYLuTa, and from this summary account there is, unfortunately, no
explicit confirmation for Hansen's division of jurisdiction.
An important procedural principle is, however, indicated in Harpocration's account: impeachments for high crimes against the state,
involving imminent peril and thus requiring immediate decision by
the body politic, are to be given a hearing before the councilor the
assembly without delay.9 It is evident that cases of treason and conspiracy against the democracy are regarded as the chief grounds for
eisangelia; this priority is clear in other references from the orators
and lexicographers.
The earliest and clearest statement of the law is given in Hyperides'
speech for Euxenippus (3.8, from the early 320's): €av TLS' ••• (1) TOV
~ ~
" AO"IvaLWV ICaTal\VrI •.• "I (2) UVVLrI 1TOL €1TL ICaTal\VUEL TOV~
U"lJJ.0V
TOV
~
t ' uvvaj'aj'rI,
'"
" TLS' 1TOI\LV
''1.
'
~ ~"
~ "I"
U"lJJ.0V,
"I €TaLpLICOV
"I (3) €av
TLva
1TpOu~
"I vavS'
I

I

I

I

I

'\ I

"

\

I

,

,

'\ I

"

/:,,,
,
' " (4) P"ITWP
t I
.,.
''I. I
'"
~
1T€':,"IV"I VaVTLIC"IV UTpaTLav, "I
wv JJ."I 1\€j'rI Ta apLUTa T~

~ I

~

u"lJJ.~ T~

, AO"lvalwv xp~JJ.aTa AaJJ./3avwv.

The same order of offenses is given in
the lexicographers' notes derived from Theophrastus' Peri Nomon,
Lex Cant. s. v. €Zuaj'j'€Ala, and Poll. 8.52.10 The priority given charges
of treason and conspiracy suggests in itself that these were the principlov ~ vav~ ~ 71'f'~V CTTpanav, ~ Uv n~ fl~ Toh 71'oAfl-'lov~ CU/>&ICvf/Ta& ~ I-'fTO&ICii 71'ap' aVTo,~
~ CTTpaTfV71Ta& I-'fT' aVTWV ~ awpa Aal-'f3a.vl1. Cf. Lipsius 194 n.53; and see n.1 0 infra.
9 The principle that the urgency of the wrong governed the procedure was observed
by Lipsius in discussing the trials of Miltiades, Hipparchus, and Themistocles (17981): "seit Kleisthenes die Volksgemeinde selbst tiber Verbrechen zu Gerichte gesessen
hat, die ihren Bestand oder ihre Sicherheit zu bedrohen schienen."
10 Poll. 8.52: fYIVOVTO at flCTaYYfAla& ICa& ICaTa TWV ICaTaAVOJlTWJI TOV Mil-'oV P71TOpwV, ~

I-'~ Ta IJ.p&CTTa Tip a~l-'cp AfyOVTWV, ~ 71'pO~ TOV~ 71'OAfl-'lov~ IJ.VfV TOV 71'fl-'</>8fjva& Ct7l'fA80VTWV,
~ 71'pOaOVTWV </>POVP&OJl ~ CTTpanav ~ vav~, ~~ efO</>paCTTo~ fV Tip 71'PWTCP 71'fP& VOl-'wv, Han-

sen (13) rightly observes that the reference in Poll. 8.52 and Lex.Cant. (supra n.8) to
"rhetores involved in conspiracy against the democracy" results from corruption of
the original wording, with P~TWP ~v misplaced before the disjunctive ;;. The discre-
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pal and original grounds of eisangelia to the assembly, and that the
secondary charges, (3) betrayal of strategic posts or expeditionary
forces and (4) corruption and deception, were added to the nomos
eisangeltikos.
There were two major revisions or additions to the nomoi eisangeltikoi after 461. 11 It was suggested by Thalheim, and accepted by Hansen, that ca 411/0 provisions were added to the law forbidding hetairika and extending or clarifying the definition of prodosia to include
betrayal of strategic posts or expeditionary forces. Thus the clause in
~"
~'"
" TLS 7TO"tV
, \. TLva\ 7TpOu~~"7J vavs
H ypen.d es 3.8,€av
7J 7r€<:.7JV
7J VaVTLK7JV CTTpaTLav, was probably added about this time (and certainly not later than
405). It is also likely that the next provision against speakers who
advocate policies "not in the best interest of the people" and are guilty
of corruption was an addendum to the law in this period or soon afterward: earlier there appear to be separate statutes concerning prosecution for corruption and deception of the people. A second revision
of the nomos eisangeltikos can be securely dated ca 361: Swoboda first
observed that all eisangeliai after 361 were tried before the court and
the death penalty was prescribed; the role of the assembly seems to
have been restricted to preliminary debate leading to a decree for
trial. It should also be noted that no instance of eisangelia to the
council is recorded after 357/6. In considering the respective jurisdictions of the council and assembly in classical procedure, we should
therefore examine the trials before 361 separately.
A clearly discernible pattern emerges from the evidence that Hansen has assembled for eisangeliai down to 361, suggesting that the assembly held official jurisdiction in cases of treason: for nine cases we
have strong indications that the trial was held before the ekklesia, and
only cases of treason were tried by the full assembly.
The first and most famous of these trials is that of the Arginusae
generals. Upon report of the battle and its aftermath, the strategoi
were deposed by apocheirotonia (Xen. Hell. 1.7.1, TOVs CTTpaT7JYovs
E'7raVCTaV; cf. Diod. 13.101.5). It is clear from the speeches in XenS,

,

pancy between Pollux's reference to the first book and the reference to Book 4 in
Lex. Cant. probably results from a misreading of A for ~.
11 H. Swoboda, "Ueber den Process des Perikles," Hermes 28 (1893) 536-98, esp.
573-75; Th. Thalheim, "Zur Eisangelie in Athen," Hermes 37 (1902) 339-45 and
"Eisangelie-Gesetz in Athen," Hermes 41 (1906) 304-09; cf. Hansen 17, 51-53. The
indictments quoted in Hyp. 3.29 and 39 give an extended version of the provision
against deception, p~Topa lfvTa >"(YHV #J-~ Ta Ci.pLITTa TC!> a~p'~ ... xp~p.aTa >"ap.!3avovTa
Kat awp£as- 7rapa TWV TCt.vaVTla 7rpaTT()VTWV TC!> a~p.~. On separate procedure against
deception, see the discussion on probote nn.16-18 infra.
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ophon's account that abandonment of the shipwrecked men was
treated as prodosia (e.g. WpOaOuLav KaTayvovTEs, 1.7.33), and this interpretation accords with the third clause in Hyperides' citation of the
nomos eisangeltikos. Before the charges of abandonment were heard,
Erasinides, one of the generals, was tried before the court and imprisoned for embezzlement. As a result of information revealed at the
court hearing, the council had the other generals taken into custody
and, after a preliminary hearing of its own, brought charges before the
people.
The council was then ordered to draw up a probouleuma to determine the procedure for trial «iTC!> TPOWC!> ••• KPLVOLVTO, 1.7.7). In the
council Callixenus, one of the bouleutai acting ex officio, moved that
the generals be judged collectively, by one vote, without further debate in the ekklesia. This proposal was adopted by the council and
brought before the assembly, where it was challenged as unconstitutional by Euryptolemus, kinsman of Pericles, one of the defendants.
At first the prytaneis refused to put the matter to a vote; but, on a motion that opponents to the procedure be subject to the same penalties
as the generals, the challenge was withdrawn. A counter-proposal was
brought by Euryptolemus that the generals be tried by the decree of
' / TLS TOV
\ TWV A6 71vaLwv
/
,
/
,
Cannonus, Eav
u71ILOV auLK'l1, UEUEILEVOV aWOuLKELV
~v T~ a~ILc!> (1.7.20). Apparently this procedure was at first approved,
but an objection was raised and a second vote was taken in favor of
the council's proposal. After the generals had been condemned and
put to death, "the people repented" and Callixenus and his supporters
were tried for deception by probole ( 1.7.35).
It is sometimes assumed that the illegality of Callixenus' decree lay
in judging all the generals collectively, but that does not appear to be
the thrust of Euryptolemus' arguments. The decree of Cannonus does
not in fact preclude the trial of several defendants en masse, as is
sometimes supposed (cf, 1.7.19: KaL TOUS aaUCOvvTas ElMTES ICOAclUEU6E
'" f'lovn.71u
R / \.
8E ULK'l1,
~/
~
/
av
KaL\ U.ILa
waVTES
KaL\ Ka 8' Eva EKaUTOV. 0 n the cont rary,
the illegality of Callixenus' procedure lies in the denial of due process
(which would have allowed at least a full day to hear both sides). It is
this rush to judgment that Euryptolemus regards not only as a violation of the rights of the accused but a deception of the demos (~,a
waT718fjvaL VILaS, 19). Ironically, Euryptolemus' first objection was silenced by the outcry that "it would be a terrible precedent if the will of
the people were thwarted," but the real infringement of the people's
authority lay in the infringement of their right to conduct a full
hearing. In essence the generals were condemned without trial (awo).).VVTES aKpLTovS wapa T~>V VOILOV, 25); by concluding the proceedings
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after no more than preliminary debate in the assembly and investigation in the council, the proposal restricted the rightful jurisdiction
of the assembly,12
Thus the legalities in these notorious proceedings tend to confirm
rather than disprove the principle that treason trials were controlled
by the assembly. The procedure proposed by Euryptolemus, according to the decree of Cannonus, suggests that p.'Y'CTTa a.o"c~p.aTa of this
kind were ordinarily tried before the people; the role of the council
was restricted to preliminary investigation and probouleusis. The decree of Cannonus, which is cited as a statute of venerable antiquity, is
generally attributed to the era of Cleisthenes' reforms, and it is a further indication that the sovereignty of the people was established in
such cases long before Ephialtes' 'revolution'.
In eight cases after 405 charges of treason were initiated and tried
in the ekklesia, without reference to the court and without any record
of a preliminary verdict by the council, including the trials of Thrasybulus and Timotheus:
(1) against Ergoc1es, colleague of Thrasybulus, deposed by apocheirotonia for
the loss of the Thracian Chersonese, 389 B.C. (Hansen's catalogue no. 73);
(2) against Thrasybulus for the loss of a squadron off Abydos, 387 (no. 75);
(3) against Thrasybulus for the loss ofthe Cadmeia, 382 (no. 76);
(4) against Timotheus, by apocheirotonia, for failure to relieve Corcyra, 373
(no. 80);
(5) against Antimachus, in connection with the charges against Timotheus,
373 (no. 81);
12 R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle I (Chicago 1930) 208f, suggest that it was the law of Cannonus that guaranteed
to the people jurisdiction in capital cases, from which the clause of the bouleutic oath
in IG P 105.36f derives; but see also Hignett (155, 303-05) who suggests that the
decree of Cannonus was "a later modification of the law under which Miltiades was
tried." The view that the decree of Cannonus contained a guarantee of separate hearings for each defendant is unwarranted: the proposal for separate trials (i5lXa ~Ka(TTOJl,
Xen. Hell. 1.7.34) is an addition to the procedure in Cannonus' decree, not an explanation of it. See I. ad Ar. Ecc!. I089f and G. E. Underhill, ed., Xenophon, Hellenica (Oxford 1906) 332 n.2. Euryptolemus also suggested, as an alternate procedure,
that the people refer the case to a dikasterion "according to the law against sacrilege
and treason" (22); here again, the point of his argument is in favor of due process
rather than separate hearings for each defendant. The reference to these proceedings
at Ath.Pol. 34.1 also tends to support this interpretation, although, as elsewhere in
fourth-century tradition, there is some confusion in details: we are told, for example,
that all ten generals (cf PI. Ap. 328) were condemned by one vote (J.t,~ XnpoTOJll/l-),
tantamount to 'deception' (£fa7TaT718'JlTo!; TOt) i5~p.ov). But cheirotonia refers not to the
final verdict (by ballots) but to the procedural vote 'by show of hands', by which the
defendants were denied due process; cf MacDowell, JHS 95 (1975) 70, who knows of
"no instance of X€LPOTOVE'iv .•• not carried out by xlipH," and notes that this term
does not apply to jury proceedings.
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(6) against Timagoras, for treason and corruption on embassy to the Great
King, 367 (no. 82);
(7) against Callisthenes, for armistice with Perdiccas against Athenian interests, 362 (no. 85);
(8) against Ergophilus, for betrayal of the Chersonese, 362 (no. 86).

In a number of other cases for similar offenses, trial before the ekklesia is possible or probable, including the prosecution of Thucydides
(no. 10) and that of Dionysius (no. 74) in connection with the same
losses for which Ergocles was tried before the people in 389 (cf cases
64, 68, 77, 88).13
In the few cases before 361 for which our sources give the charges as
prodosias and which the assembly referred to the court trial, the
grounds of the indictment may also be interpreted as official misconduct. In some cases it is possible that the charges were brought in the
regular accountings or by other procedures against misconduct in office: in the trial of Anytus, for the loss of Pylos in 409 (no. 65), Hansen
rejects the note in Lex.Seg. 236.6 (Ta~ Eb8vva~ a,aov~ Tfj~ (V I1vAl1 UTpaT1ryla~) primarily on the testimony of Diodorus that the case was
initiated in the assembly (13.64.6). In the trials of the generals who
acted without authorization in the liberation of Thebes (379/8, nos.
77-78) and in the trials of Callistratus and Chabrias for the loss of
Oropus (366/5, nos. 83-84) euthynai are again likely alternatives, but
Hansen is unwilling to believe that the Athenians would have waited
until year's end to prosecute. Aside from the prosecution of Antiphon
(to be discussed infra) we know of no other case before 361 in which
13 Two sets of trials involve embassies, in which-although prodosias is given in
our sources as the official charge-the real case for the prosecution appears to be
corruption, deception, or policy 'not in the public interest'. For the trials of the generals Eurymedon, Pythodorus, and Sophocles for concluding an unacceptable peace
with the Sicilians in 425/4 (Thuc. 4.65.3: Hansen nos. 7-9), we have no clear indication whether the trial was initiated in the councilor assembly, or whether it was tried
in the assembly or the court. The specific charges are given in Thucydides as awpo,s
7TWT8fIlTfS, and we know that one among those convicted was fined. For the case
against Andocides and other ambassadors who returned from Sparta with unacceptable peace terms in 392/1 (nos. 69-72), we have more specific evidence: it is clear
that a preliminary investigation was held in the council. Demosthenes (19.278f)
explicitly compares the provisions of the decree against the ambassadors of 391 with
the case against his own adversary; and in the wording of the decree it is evident that
the principal grounds of prosecution were deception and corruption, 7Tapa Ta

ypap.p.aTa . . . f7Tpfu-{Jf.VCTall • . . Kat ~Afx8"1CTall nllf.S aVTOOV fll TV f30VAV ov TaA"18ij
a7TaYYfAAOVTfS ..• ova' f7T'CTTfAAOIITU ... TaA"18ij ... KaL KaTa"'f.VaOP.f.1I0' Tooll CTvp.p.aXWII
KaL aoopa Aap.f3allovTU. The similarity to the trials of Timagoras and Callisthenes in the

360's (supra) seems to indicate trial before the assembly; but the reference to
preliminary investigation in the council (rather than debate in the ekklesia) and
comparison to the case against Aeschines suggest trial before the court.
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the principal charges are described as prodosias, for which a court trial
is clearly indicated.
(b) Apocheirotonia and probole

A number of prosecutions against magistrates for treasonable offenses were initiated in the ekklesia by apocheirotonia, including cases
tried before the court, as well as some cases tried before the full assembly. Apocheirotonia also afforded a means of bringing charges of
corruption or abuse of office against public officials during their term
of office, and in such cases the people decreed trial before the court.
Such impeachments, whether for treason or for lesser offenses, were
initiated by the vote of the people in the Kvpla (KKATJCTla of each
prytany. This 'vote of dismissal' led to a decree for trial; in some cases
special prosecutors were named, but ordinarily the original accuser
led the prosecution; in convictions the jury decided between the penalties proposed by the prosecutors and the defendants. A large number of trials in the later fifth and fourth centuries, described as eisangeliai or euthynai, were initiated in this way, and it has been suggested that a similar procedure was followed in some trials of the preEphialtic period. l4 By such procedures the demos asserted authority
in cases of official misconduct, the area of jurisdiction that belonged
ordinarily to the council and, by tradition, to the Areopagus.
The case against Pericles for embezzlement in 430/29-to cite the
most famous example (Thuc. 2.65.3)-was initiated by apocheirotonia (Diod. 12.45.4) and was, presumably, tried before the court by
decree of the people (Plut. Per. 35.4). It has been argued, long ago by
Swoboda and more recently by Hansen, that this is the same trial
described in Pluto Per. 31 f; but the preponderance of the evidence
clearly indicates two separate impeachments involving two similar
but distinct procedures for charges against incumbent officials. ls The
14 Two trials for 'betrayal of strategic posts', against Ergocles (no. 73) and against
Timotheus (no. 80), were initiated by apocheirotonia and tried in the assembly. The
trial of Leosthenes (no. 88), general in 362/1, for 'betrayal' of his ships (vav~
'lTpOaOVVaL, Hyp. 3.1 f) in the defeat at Peparethos, was probably also initiated by
apocheirotonia and tried before the court; Autocles (no. 90) and Cephisodotus (no.
96) were tried for similar offenses in this way, as was Pericles on a charge of
embezzlement or adikia (no. 6). For discussion of this procedure and a list of eisangeliai initiated by apocheirotonia, see Hansen 24f n.21, 41-44; cf. J. T. Roberts,
Accountability in Athenian Government (Madison 1982) 14-29.
IS Hansen 71-73 follows the view of Swoboda (supra n.ll: 536-98) that there was
one trial of Pericles (not two, as Plutarch suggests), initiated by apocheirotonia; that
the decree of Dracontides with Hagnon's amendment governed the procedure in this
trial; and that the decree and trial are to be dated to the late summer and fall of 430.
Swoboda (538f) accepted the conclusions of R. Schoell (SitzMUnchen 1 [1888] 12f)
that Ephorus was responsible for a doublet in Plutarch (cf. Diod. 12.39.2: Kat aVTOV

CARAWAN, EDWIN M., "Eisangelia" and "Euthyna": the Trials of Miltiades, Themistocles, and
Cimon , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28:2 (1987:Summer) p.167

EISANGELIA AND EUTHYNA

178

procedural details of these two cases, in fact, help to define the division of jurisdiction between council and assembly.
In the earlier case Pericles, as epistates for the statue of Athena, was
implicated in the charges of theft against Phidias (43817): by Dracontides' decree Pericles was ordered to hand over his financial accounts
to the prytaneis and face trial on the acropolis, the verdict to be cast
with ballots sanctified on the altar of the goddess. Hagnon, by an
amendment to the decree, called for a trial before a jury of 1,500 and
prosecution by b /30VAOP.£VOS, on charges ordinarily lodged at the annual euthynai. The grounds of the indictment are given as £tT£ KA07J'ijS
Ka& awpwv £rT' aa'K{OV /30VAO'TO ns ovofLa(nv T~V a{w"v (Plut. Per. 32.4;
cf. Ath.Pol. 54.2 and the discussion infra, on charges in euthynai). The
role of the prytaneis conducting the audit corresponds to the ordinary
function of council members as logistai in the monthly audit of official accounts in each prytany: cf. Ath.Pol. 48.3 and 46.2 ([sc. ~ /30VA~]
't
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T7JP{~). In such accountings the council's indictment only requires
procedural vote of the ekklesia in cases involving major penalties.
This procedure is thus essentially within the jurisdiction of the boule.
The later trial is clearly related to Pericles' duties as strategos, although the precise nature of the charge is undetermined. After the
unsuccessful campaign of 430, he was deposed from office and fined,
presumably by vote of the ekklesia. The notice in Pluto 35.4 suggests
that the case was not referred to a dikasterion but tried before the
demos, who had deposed him from office (TclS ",~cpovs Aa/3ovTas E7J"
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aVTOV £'s xnpas lCa, Y£Vop.£VOVS KVP'OVS a..,,£II.£CT a, T7JV CTTpaT7Jy,av Ka,
(7Jp.,wCTa" KTA.). Presumably the council was called upon to draft a

probouleuma regarding the procedure for trial, although Plutarch's

TOU n€p"'AEOVS ICaT7/,YopoVv t€po(TvAlav). Swoboda was further convinced by PI. Grg.
515E that Pericles was impeached only once, J7f~ nAEvTfj TOU f3lov. Relying on Thuc.

2.56f, 65, Hansen argues that "the decree was passed in Aug. 430 or later and the case
was heard in Jan. 429 or earlier." F. J. Frost (JHS 84 [1964] 69-72) has connected
this trial and Dracontides' decree with the trial of Phidias (presumably 43817), separate from the impeachment of Pericles ICA07fijS in 430. The peculiar procedure in
Dracontides' original decree seems more appropriate to the charge of hierosylia given
in Diod. 12.39 than to the charge of embezzlement in 430. Frost's reconstruction is
supported by J. Mansfeld's chronology (Mnemosyne SER. 4 33 [1980] 17-95; see esp.
49f on the role of the council in supervision of public works and financial audits, and
72 on Hagnon's amendment). The two-trial theory is also followed by Roberts (supra
n.14) 31f, 59f; and by P. A. Stadter in his forthcoming commentary on Plutarch's
Pericles (of which he kindly permitted me to see a draft of his treatment of this
problem).
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notice suggests that the entire proceedings, from apocheirotonia to
final verdict, took place in the ekklesia.
There are a few cases not against incumbent officials but involving a
procedure similar to apocheirotonia, initiated in the ekklesia, in
which the charges are clearly described as corruption, deception, or
actions 'not in the public interest', and an indictment was handed
down by the assembly to the court for trial. In connection with the

affair of the Hermocopidae, Diocleides (no. 61) was cross-examined
in the council, and the assembly decreed that he be tried before the
court on charges that he had falsely accused some forty defendants.
He was convicted and executed in accordance with the preliminary
verdict of the people (cf Andoc. 1.66: V/J-£LS Of aKovuavTES TaVTa A,tOKA£lo1Jv /J-fV Tij> OtKauT1Jpl~ wapaoovTEs awuT£lvaTE). Callistratus (no.
87), P~TCJ)p wv AE-YEtV /J-~ Tn l1.ptuTa T(P O~/J-~ (Hyp. 3.1f), also came to
trial before the court by eisangelia to the assembly, and the death
penalty was proposed in the people's decree (8avaTov .q w6Ats KaT'yv~,
Lyc. 1.93). In the latter case the phrasing of the charges corresponds to
the fourth clause of Hyperides' citation of the nomos eisangeltikos.
Both cases involved charges and procedures analogous to WpO{jOA~,
which Hansen treats as a separate procedure (38f), not included in his
catalogue; but the similarity of procedure (with initiation before the
ekklesia and requiring trial before the court) suggests that probole was
an alternate means of initiating impeachment for deception and corruption.
The procedure known as WpO{jOA~ afforded a means of prosecuting
public officials, as well as citizens acting in an official capacity, for
deceptive practices, lav TtS vwouX6/J-£v6s Tt /J-~ wo,~u!1 T(P o~/J-~ (Ath.Pol.
43.5). By this procedure the accuser brought to the prytaneis a 'motion' or proposal for investigation in the ekklesia, and the assembly
gave a preliminary verdict, presumably specifying the penalty if the
defendant were convicted by the court. 16 In the classical period probo16 For procedure in probole see Harrison II 59-64; Lipsius 211-15; cf Pollux 8.46
for probole as an initiating procedure (ICAijITLS fls a{IC7Iv) against political offenses (ICaTa
TWV ICaICovCIlS npos TOV aijp.ov a,aIC£,p.tvCIlv). For probole against violations concerning the
major festivals, Oem. 21 is our most important source, and from Demosthenes'
remarks it is clear that the law of probole underwent continual revision. Three trials
are mentioned at 175ff; curiously, all involve illegal exercise of official authority
during the Dionysia. The case against Euandrus (who had arrested Menippus for
fraud during the Dionysia), for example, shows that (a) penalty was proposed in the
people's decree, and (b) the original plaintiff was under no obligation to carry through
the prosecution. The plaintiff may drop his suit if restitution is made (as in the case
against Meidias), but the people may then proceed against the defendant in
accordance with their preliminary decree (katacheirotonia). The meaning of the term
npofjaAA£1T8a, is variously given as "proponere aliquid ad disceptandum et iudican-

CARAWAN, EDWIN M., "Eisangelia" and "Euthyna": the Trials of Miltiades, Themistocles, and
Cimon , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28:2 (1987:Summer) p.167

180

EISANGELIA AND EUTHYNA

Ie was invoked primarily against two specific categories of offenses,
'sycophancy' and violations in connection with the major festivals;
but it is likely that a similar procedure was available against a broader
range of public wrongs in the earlier period.
Isocrates claims that 7rpof3oAal were instituted, along with other
remedies against deceptive practices, under the Solonian constitution
(15.314): lCaTCz at TOVTWV [sc. Tiiw uVlCoq>avTCdv] ypaq>Cz!O p.tV 7rpo!O
I
Q
",
Q "I
~ ~ ,
'
,
" ' u~" El!O T1JV
8EUP.O 8ETa!O,
ElUaYYEI\La!O
tJ0VI\1JV,
7rp0tJ0l\a!O
u~" EV TC!>
u1Jp.C!>.

TOU!O

It IS
.
evident throughout his argument that Isocrates is not using the term
'sycophants' narrowly of malicious prosecutors, but, in answer to the
slander against 'sophists', is referring to demagogues engaged in deceptive practices generally. Despite Isocrates' notoriously revisionist
view of the patrios politeia, he is likely to be right in supposing some
precedent for 7rpof3oA~ in archaic procedure.
The original grounds for prosecution by probole correspond to
those for eisangelia against deception, P~TWP ~v p.~ A'Y!1 TCz li.pLuTa Tij>
o~p.C!>, which is likely to be a late addendum to the nomos eisangeltikoso The grounds for introducing probolai in the sixth prytany are
given in Ath.Pol. 43.5 as [lCaTCz] uVlCoq>avT(;w ••• ICli.V TL!O V7rOUX6P.EV6!O TL
p.~ 7rOL~U!1 TfiJ a~P.Cfl. Similar phrasing for an 'ancient statute' against
deceptive practices is found at Dem. 20 in a graphe paranomon: fUTL
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it is reasonable to conclude that probole was an ancient procedure
against 'deception of the people'}1

dum" (0. SchOmann, De comitiis Ath. [1828] 228) or simply "jemand zu einem Amte
vorschlagen" (Lipsius 215 n.); but the peculiar two-stage procedure, before the people
and before the court, suggests that the original meaning of probole may have been
'motion for prosecution', notifying the prytaneis of a private suit that might warrant
prosecution in the public interest. By the preliminary decree, the accused is judged
guilty and penalty proposed by the people (cj. Bemeker, RE 23.1 [1957] 44 S.v.
'lrpO~OA~); and the people may nominate public prosecutors, for which the term
'lrpo~aAAfcr8a, is also used: Pluto Per. 10.5 (=Stesimbr. FGrHist 107F5; Dem. 14.4=
Theopomp. 115F327).
17 On the date of the fourth clause of Hyperides' citation of the nomos eisangeltikos, see supra n.11. The antiquity of the procedure in probolai is indicated by its
inclusion, along with ostracism, among the duties of the prytaneis at A th. Pol. 43.5.
The term 'lrpo~aAAfcr8a, is also used of prosecution in the public interest in a fragment
of Solon (Plut. Sol. 18.7). On the evidence of Against Timotheus ([Oem.] 49.67),
however, Hansen (14) insists that eisangelia was the proper remedy against such
deceptive practices: 1I0P.WII I1I1TWII fall n~ Tall afjP.OIl V'lrO(TXOP.fIlO~ f~a'lraT~(T?1, fZcraYYfA{all
fIliaL 'lrfP' aVTov. It is likely that this provision too was added to the nomos eisangelti-
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The clearest case of probole on grounds of O,7TaT7J TOt) a~P.OV came as
a consequence of the prosecution of the Arginusae generals: (Xen.
Hell. 1.7.35): KaL ou 7ToAA/i> xp6v~ t>CTnpov P.ETEP.EAE TOLS ' A07Jvalots KaL
, ,I, ""
,~
l:
Q
\'
,...
,.
Th e
E",7J'f'tCTavTO OtTtVES TOV U7JP.OV Ert;7J7TaT7JCTav 7TpOfJOAaS aVTWV ELvat.
case against Diocleides for false charges in the affair of the Hermocopidae (supra) is precisely parallel. The condemnation of Agoratus
(Lys. 13.65) is also regarded as a probole. It has been suggested,
moreover, that some eisangeliai of the pre-Ephialtic period were
initiated by probole or an analogous procedure. IS
In the classical period the people held right of initiative against official misconduct involving deception and corruption through apocheirotonia, probole, or analogous procedure under the nomos eisangeltikos; it appears to be a rule of procedure in such cases that the
people handed down an indictment to the court for trial. We know of
no trial before the full assembly for such charges in the period 461361. This rule suggests that a similar division of jurisdiction governed
such cases in the pre-Ephialtic period, and charges of deception and
corruption initiated in the ekklesia were handed down to a second
judicial body, whether the court or the Areopagus.
1
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The clause of the bouleutic oath cited in Against Timocrates suggests that the council had special jurisdiction and right of initiative in
cases involving suspicion of conspiracy to overthrow the democracy:
in such cases the bouleutai had the right if not the obligation to arrest
and imprison the suspected conspirators (without option of surety).
The verb aA/i> in this context cannot mean 'be convicted (by a prior
kos after 410, and that hitherto probole had been the usual procedure for initiating
charges of deception.
18 The second trial of Miltiades 'for deception of the people' was presumably initiated by probole (Lipsius 180; cf. Harrison I 60f). For probole against magistrates cf.
Harp. s. v. KaraXfLporovla: (80S ~v 'A8~v7JUL Kara. rwv a.Pxovrwv Kat Kara. rwv UVKoq,avrwv 7Tp0{30)..a.s fV TijJ a~p'~ Tl8fu8aL. The peculiar procedure in probole may also account
for the obscure allegations against Cleon (Theopomp. F94) for corruption in the
tribute assessment, which forced him to "cough up five talents"-though tiie case
apparently never came to trial; for discussion of the relevant fragments see W. R.
Connor, Theopompus and Fifth Century Athens (Washington [D.C.] 1968) 53-59.
Similarly, Aristophon evaded charges in probole by returning the crowns that he had
illegally acquired (Oem. 21.151). On the condemnation of Agoratus see J. O. Lofberg,
Sycophancy in Athens (Chicago 1917) 92; cf. K. Latte, RE 2.4 (1932) 1032 s. v.
(TVKo</Javrlas 'Ypa</J7J.
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judgment)'. A convicted traitor would be subject to execution without
re-trial if apprehended, and there would be no question of surety or
imprisonment. It is a reasonable conclusion, therefore, that the council conducted a preliminary investigation, arrested suspected conspirators on its own authority, and handed down a preliminary verdict.
The speaker of Oem. 24 refers to Solon as the author of the bouleutic
oath (148: OVaE a~uw ' A8r/Va{wv OVaEva), but such attributions are suspect: even if the rule against imprisonment is part of an authentic
Solonian oath, the exception, giving authority to the council to order
imprisonment in cases of conspiracy, is not likely to have been part of
Solon's constitution}9
At Ath.Pol. 8.4 we are told that Solon conferred jurisdiction in
conspiracy cases upon the Areopagus: lCal. TOVS (,"I. lCaTaAVUEt TOt) a~P.OV
,
"
~ ''I.
8EVTOS
'
,
,
'I. '
,
~
It
uvv,uTafLEVOVS
EICP'VEV,
L.OI1.WVOS
VOfLOV
uuaYYEl1.tas
,"Ept\aVTWV.
seems inherently unlikely that Solon entrusted the guardianship of his
democratic reforms to the aristocratic council; and the anachronism
of the phrase (,"I. lCaTaAVUEt TOt) a~p'ov has led some to suppose that
Solon's nomos eisangeltikos is a fiction of fourth-century propaganda.
It is more reasonable, however, to assume that Solon's conspiracy law
is genuine but was misinterpreted by the atthidographers and Ath.
Pol.: Plutarch cites a law of Solon excluding from amnesty those
exiled for "tyrannical conspiracy" by the Areopagites (Sol. 19.3f), and
it is therefore likely that Solon revised the Draconian statutes governing conspiracy and subversion and formalized the jurisdiction of the
Areopagus. There is no evidence that the Solonian council exercised
other than a probouleutic function before Cleisthenes' reforms, and
thus, by default, it is assumed that the Areopagus controlled conspiracy trials. Since we have no direct testimony that Cleisthenes restricted the powers of the Areopagus, Rhodes has argued that this was
among the powers transferred to the council and assembly by Ephialtes' reforms; but, as we shall see, there is ample proof that the council
had assumed right of initiative in such cases long before Ephialtes. 2o
In prosecutions for conspiracy in the classical period, the limited
evidence we have suggests that the council took up the preliminary
investigation and handed down their findings to the ekklesia to decree
for trial. For the period 415-404 we know of five cases in which the
19 Cf. M. Ostwald, "The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion,"
TAPA 86 (1955) 103-28, esp. 111-14, on the oath "sworn by all Athenians" against
tyranny (Andoc. 1.96-98), also attributed to Solon.
20 On the interpretation of Ath.Pol. 8.4 see Ostwald (supra n.19) 111 f; Hansen 1719 and 56f; Rhodes 156 ad loco and 54 n.267; Sealey (supra n.3 [1981]) 129-31;
Carawan 116-24.
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charges included conspiracy €WL KaTaA.'6u£L TOll a~JJ.OV: (1) the proceedings concerning the profanation of the Mysteries; (2) the case against
the Hermocopidae; (3) the trial of Antiphon; (4) the trial of Aristarchus (no. 63); and (5) the prosecution based on Agoratus' information. For the trial of Aristarchus, cited by Euryptolemus as precedent for his proposal to follow the law of Cannonus in the trial of the
Arginusae generals (Xen. Hell. 1.7.28), it would appear that prodosias
was the principal charge, and we have no indication that the council
took up the preliminary investigation as in the other cases.
The trials in connection with the profanation of the Mysteries also
involved the council in the preliminary investigation of charges to be
handed down to the assembly to decree for trial (nos. 13-42). The
council was made autokrator, and a board of special investigators was
appointed. It is likely that the procedure in this case was dictated by
suspicion of conspiracy. In the prosecution of the Hermocipidae (nos.
43-60) and in the original procedure adopted against those accused of
conspiracy on Agoratus' information, it is clear that the council took
up the case and rendered a preliminary verdict. Unfortunately, both
cases proceeded under unusual circumstances: in the case of the Hermocopidae, as a result of the council's investigation, Diocleides' information was discredited and those under suspicion were released; in
the case of Agoratus' menusis, after charges had been drawn up by the
council and submitted to the assembly to decree for trial, the Thirty
came to power and ordered the case to be tried in the council, without
reference to the assembly or the court. Despite the irregularities, these
cases clearly indicate that the council was ordinarily invoked for investigation of charges of conspiracy and subversion. 21
The trial of Antiphon is the only case of the four that is listed in
Hansen's brief catalogue of eisangeliai to the council (no. 137). The
formal charges are given in our sources as prodosias in connection
with the embassy to Sparta, but it is evident from the fragment of
Antiphon's apologia that a principal issue was his complicity in the
conspiracy that brought to power the Four Hundred, and he was
accused of intrigue against the moderate government that succeeded
them. 22 Again, the constitutional setting is unusual, but the council's
21 For the investigation based on Agoratus' menusis, see Lys. 13.19-38; cf. Hansen
86 (no. 67). In the profanation of the mysteries and mutilation of the herms, suspicion of conspiracy to overthrow the democracy is indicated at Thuc. 6.27.3, 28.2,
53.3; Andoc. 1.36; Diod. 13.2. Cf Hansen 79-82 (nos. 43-60); D. MacDowell, ed.,
Andocides. De mysteriis (Oxford 1962) 67-104, esp. 73f, 80-82, 87,94, with reference
to the role of council members.
22 Cf, Harp. s. v. U"TaU"UdTTW KaTTryopl1K£v ws U"TaU"LWT'1/S ~ Kal fyl.! .... The papyrus
(coll.I-3) also indicates suspicion of conspiracy: 7rWS £lKOS fU"nv fILf o)uyapx{as
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authority for preliminary investigation and decree for trial is consistent with the legal principles in other cases involving suspicion of
conspiracy and in the bouleutic oath. Antiphon was brought to trial
under the interim regime of the Five Thousand, and it is likely that
the council of five hundred, who prepared the case for trial, was an
elected council, not chosen by lot in the usual way. From the council's
decree ([Plut.] Mor. 833E-F) the procedure can be reconstructed as
follows: the generals brought charges against Antiphon and the other
ambassadors for plotting against national security; the council ordered that the accused be held in custody and (apparently without
reference to the Five Thousand) handed over to the court for trial.
The generals themselves acted as prosecutors, along with synegoroi
co-opted from among the members of the council; in addition to the
indictment of the strategoi, it was provided that "any concerned
citizen" (0 (30VA0lJ-fVOS) could bring further charges, according to the
law of treason. Under the constitution of the Five Thousand, the
council was empowered to decide issues ordinarily submitted to the
assembly (cf, Ath.Pol. 30.4-31.2); thus the apparent procedural anomaly, that capital charges were decided (1VfV TOV a~lJ-ov 7rA710VOVTOS, is
irrelevant. The council's right of initiative in cases involving suspicion of conspiracy was founded on pre-Ephialtic precedent.
It is likely that the council and assembly assumed jurisdiction in
trials for conspiracy (Tvpavvlaos) in the era of Cleisthenes' reforms.
The decree against the followers of Isagoras is the only case E7r1. Tvpavvla, known to us from this period, and by any reconstruction of these
events it is highly unlikely (pace Hignett) that it was the Areopagus
that opposed the coup: cf, Ath.Pol. 20.3, T~V IJ-fV {30VA~V E7rflpaTO ICaTa\.
' ]' I cra-yopav
'
51< \
,~
A. '\.
I\vnv sc. 0 KI\f0lJ-fV71S,
uf
ICa,\ Tp,aICocr,ovs
TWV .,,'I\WV
IJ-fT '
,
0
'
'\.
51<' R
\.
,
,
\
aVTOV ICVP'OVS ICa ,crTava, T71S 7rOl\fWS. T71S uf fJoVI\71s avncrTacr71S ICa, crvva\. '

,~

[

f

~

~

~

OPO,crOEVTOS TOV 7rA~OOVS ••• ; Hdt. 5.72.4, (although Isagoras escaped)
TOVS af (1AAOVS ' A071va'io, ICaTEa71crav T~V E7r1. OavaT~. It is the prevailing

view that Isagoras was opposed by the Solonian council of 400 in
support of Cleisthenes' proposed reforms; Hignett insisted that the
{30VA~ that opposed Isagoras was the Areopagus, but on this assumption he is forced to argue that the members of the Areopagus, including many former supporters of the Pisistratids, had joined the party of
Cleisthenes against the Pisistratid loyalist Isagoras (4)lAOS ~v TWV
Tvpavvwv, Ath.Pol. 20.1). It is more likely that the aristocratic families
who supported Isagoras were strongly represented in the Areopagite
E'1u8vp.('''; These fragments are considered genuine, but Hansen 113f does not seem to
accept the authenticity of this charge or its implications for the procedure.
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council, whereas the Alcmeonidae, exiled under the tyranny (Hdt.
6.123), would not have had a strong voice in the Areopagus. 23 In both
Herodotus and Ath.Pol. it is clear that there was a popular uprising
against Isagoras, and the phrasing of Ath.Pol. 20.3 suggests that the
revolt of the people was directed by the democratic council. Herodotus indicates that a decree against the followers of Isagoras was passed
by the assembly, and a scholium on Ar. Lys. 273 suggests that the
same decree passed sentence of banishment upon Isagoras and any of
his followers who had escaped. Although we have no specific information concerning the initiating procedure, there is a close parallel to the
trials of Hipparchus and Themistocles in the role of the council in
asserting the people's right of initiative and in the decree for exile or
execution. This decision may be regarded as our earliest instance of
eisangelia to the assembly for treason and conspiracy against the
democracy; indeed, it is likely that the emergency procedure in this
instance set precedent for the later trials. 24
(d) Eisangelia to the council and euthyna
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(Ath.Pol. 45.2).

Of ten cases listed in Hansen's brief catalogue of eisangeliai to the
council (leaving aside the trial of Antiphon), all involve charges of
official misconduct that may be construed as Il~ xpfju8aL TOLS VOIlOLS
(although in some instances our sources also refer to charges of prodosia). Rhodes acknowledges that "it was clearly not normal for
charges Il~ xpfju8aL TOLS VOIlOLS to be considered by the ekklesia," but he
argues that such major political offenses as embezzlement and corruption could be prosecuted by either procedure, initiated before either
the council or the assembly and tried before the court or assembly
according to the people's decree. 25 We have seen, however, that all
23 Cf P. Cloche, REG 37 (1924) 1-26. Hignett is nearly alone in arguing that the
council that opposed Isagoras was the Areopagus, 94f, 128, 146-49 (against the view
of G. de Sanctis, ' AT8,,; [Rome 1912] 353). See also M. Ostwald, Nomos and the
Beginnings ofAthenian Democracy (Oxford 1969) 143-45; Rhodes (supra n.4) 246.
24 See BusoltlSwoboda 1007; Ostwald (supra n.19) 109 n.31. Cf 1: ad Ar. Lys. 273:

TooV aE- p.fTa KAfOP.(VOV'; , EAfvulva ICaTauxovTCIlV ' A87Jvalo, Ta,; olIC,a,; ICaT(UICatav ICaL Ta';
ovuias fa~P.fVUaV, aVToov at- 8avaTOV b/t7JcpiuaVTO.
25 Rhodes (JHS 99 [1979] 112) rightly observes that a number of cases initiated in
the boule may be described as prodosias or official misconduct; but we should be wary
of the orators' hyperbole. Rhodes objects, for instance, that Aristophon's prosecution
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known trials before the full assembly involved charges of treason,
although we know of many cases involving charges of corruption and
official misconduct that were tried before the court. Rhodes is right to
insist that the same offenses might be initiated before the people by
apocheirotonia or before the council; but we should not disregard the
important division of jurisdiction indicated in the catalogue of known
cases and in the Ath.Pol.: along with their jurisdiction in the regular
accountings, the council members had special competence to investigate and initiate proceedings against wrongdoing in public office. It
is this area of their authority that is most likely to be an inheritance
from the Areopagus.
Most of the cases in Hansen's list involve financial misconduct by
such officials as the secretary to the thesmothetai, poristai, praktores,
and trierarchs. In two cases (nos. 134 and 138) we have no indication
whether the case came to trial before the council or the court. Cleophon (no. 139) was tried for dereliction of duty in 404 by a joint
panel of the council and the court; and in the last known case, against
Theophemus in 357/6 for withholding trierarchic equipment and obstruction of the expeditionary force, the trial was held before the
council. In the case of the grain dealers (no. 141: Lys. 22) the council
first passed judgment on its own authority before a council member
proposed trial before the court.
There is also inscriptional evidence for the council's jurisdiction in
cases involving abuse of office by public officials or citizens acting in
an official capacity. In an amendment to the decree honoring the
assassins of Phrynichus, the council is authorized to investigate
charges of bribery in regard to the decree granting citizenship to Apollodorus, and to punish the offenders on its own authority or hand
down an indictment to the court. 26 In all other cases that came to trial,
the council handed down a preliminary verdict to the court without
reference to the assembly. Thus the limited evidence on eisangelia to
the council bears out Hansen's division of jurisdiction; given the role
of council members in the regular accountings, the council's authority
in cases involving official misconduct seems secure.

of the trierarchs (no. 142) is an example of eisangelia prodosias for which the council
assumed jurisdiction, but it is clear that the chief charges were official misconduct
and corruption: the trierarchs were charged with "taking bids" on the trierarchy.
26IG P 102.41-46: TtV fjoAtv fjoAEVlr]aL EV TiL 7rpOTEL ht~[paL EV TOL fjOVAEVTfpl]OL Kal
KOAcl(EV, TOV [~]opo[aOKEIr&.VTOV KaTa4>Ir]E4>L(O,uVEV Kal ES aLKalr[TtpLOV 7rapa~LaOlra]v Ka60TL
Av aOKiL aVTqL]' T[OS at fjoAEVTa.S TOS] 7rapOVTas a7ro4>alvEv •.• (IG PlIO; MIL 85). Cf.

Lipsius 184; Hansen 115f (no. 138).
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In the later fourth century the accountings of magistrates for their
terms of office were ordinarily initiated before the /ogistai and the
euthynoi, the latter chosen from among the bouleutai. If the charges
were admissible, these officials referred the indictment to the thesmothetai or the Forty for trial before the court; but the examiners were
competent to accept or reject the charges of plaintiffs, on the basis of
their own preliminary investigations. The regular accountings are defined in Ath.Pol. 48.3-5 and 54.2, but we should be wary of the assumption that these formalized procedures were followed in the period before 361. Accountings underwent extensive revision in the
period after 403, from which much of our evidence regarding actual
cases derives.27
In regard to the nature of the charges, the penalties, and the procedures involving council members in preliminary investigations leading to trial before the court, euthynai were essentially analogous to eisangeliai; our sources sometimes refer to cases initiated in the regular
accountings as 'impeachments', and to cases initiated by eisangelia as
'accountings'. Four speeches in the Lysianic corpus have to do with
euthynai, but two of the four involve procedural anomalies: Eratosthenes was probably prosecuted under a special provision for accountings of the Thirty; the speech for Polystratus is described in
Harpocration as a~JJ.ov KaTaAvuEws b,7ToAoyla; only speeches 27 (Epicrates) and 21 can be safely regarded as arguments in euthynai. The
speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines On the Embassy are generally regarded as involving a prosecution initiated in accountings, but
it has never been satisfactorily explained how the case was delayed
three years before coming to trial. Moreover, Demosthenes explicitly
compares the case to the trial of the ambassadors in 392/1, which
Hansen rightly regards as eisangelia to the assembly. Furthermore, it
should be noted that several earlier cases, including the trials of
Anytus (409) and Cimon (462/1), which our sources describe as euthynai, appear to be initiated in the assembly by apocheirotonia. 28
The board of logistai probably was established as a committee of
the council in the era after Ephialtes' reforms, but the office of the
27 Pierart 558f, 571-73; cf O. Schulthess, RE 13.1 (1926) 1012-19 S.V. Ao,),LuTa,.
Logistai for final audit are mentioned at Ath.Pol. 54.2, among other officials chosen
by lot, apparently from among the entire citizen body; it is inherently unlikely, however, that these officers were originally chosen among all citizens. Auditors in each
prytany (Ath.Pol. 48.3) were chosen by lot among bouleutai, which was probably the
original method of selecting !ogistai for annual accountings.
28 On procedure in euthynai cf Lipsius 286-98, Harrison II 208. On initiating procedures in the cases against Cimon (no. 5) and Anytus (no. 65), and a comparison of
procedures in eisangelia and euthyna, see Hansen 44-49.
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euthynoi is likely to be more ancient. 29 It is reasonable to assume that
in pre-Ephialtic procedure the duties of these examiners were performed by Areopagites. In the later tradition we are often told that the
Areopagites controlled the euthynai, and it is likely that they ordinarily tried cases initiated by members of the Areopagus ex officio
or by Areopagite examiners. The most useful reference is Ath.Pol. 4.4
(E[ijV af Tii> aaLlCOVP.EV~ 7TPOS T~V TWV ' Ap£o7TaYLTwv (3ovA~V £I.UayyEAA£LV
a7TocpalvovTL 7Tap'
aaLlC£LTaL vop.ov), which suggests that the plaintiff

av

did not himself carry through the prosecution but made his complaint
to the Areopagite euthynos, who then assumed responsibility to prosecute the case. We are also told that the people were given authority in
the accountings of elected officials by Solon, but such passages probably refer to the right of citizens to bring charges before the euthynoi
and to initiate prosecutions by apocheirotonia or an analogous procedure. 30
There is also inscriptional evidence in the classical period (assembled in Pierart: 530ff) that the euthynoi were charged to enforce specific regulations, generally concerning religious institutions and matters of national security, and that the examiners themselves were held
to account for failure to fine or prosecute other magistrates for violation of these statutes. 31 It is likely that the euthynoi held such enforcement authority under the Areopagite regime and that the rule
requiring the euthynoi themselves be held to account was an archaic
formula, as Wilamowitz argued, with little practical significance in
the later period. The accountability of the euthynoi, however, strongly
suggests that in the earlier period the examiners had abused their
magisterial authority by acquitting other magistrates without reference to the court, and at some point a procedure was prescribed to
remedy this abuse. From the fourth century we have no clear indication how the euthynoi were to be held to account for such abuses. The
only case in which we know of specific allegations against an examiner
is the prosecution of Timarchus, but this was not the principal
29IG P 244.B (IG P 188), a decree of the deme Scambonidae, mentions the euthynos, apparently with tribal jurisdiction. Pierart (572) further asserts that use of EV8vIIEu8a, indicates the authority of the euthynoi as early as 485/4.
30 Arist. Pol. 1274a15: l:oAwII yE {O"(E T~II CtllaYlCa,ontT'l1" Ct7l'0a,Mlla, TiP ari",Cf) aVila",,,,,
~ 8a, Ka,\ EV
'8'vllnll; 1281b31"
\ ,apxa&pEU'as
' \Ka,
'8
TO Tas apXas a'pnu
: E7I" TE Tas
EV '
vilas. C":/.
Hignett 204; Rhodes (supra n.4) 155. On the plausibility of Ath.Pol. 4.4 cf Sealey
(supra n.3 [1981]) 128.
31 Reconstructed in fG IP 127.18-20 (dated after 430) as: b af Ei58vIIOS Ka, OL
71'apEapO, KaTaY'YllwuKOIITWII aVTwII ~ aho, 71'panfu8wv EwavaYKEs. IG P 133 follows
Raubitschek in omitting the phrase ~ aVTo, 71'paTTfu8wv KTA. Cf, however, IG IP 1629.
238-42: Ka, ;, EiJ8vIIOS Ka, ot 71'apEapO' (7I'avaYKEs aVTwv KaTaY'YllwuKOVTWII ~ aVTO&
04>E,AoVTWV; Wilamowitz (supra n.4) II 237.
\
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grounds of charges against him.32 We may speculate that in the later
period such charges could be initiated in the internal accountings of
council members or by eisangelia, but it is reasonable to assume that
before Ephialtes' reforms the Areopagites themselves controlled such
proceedings.
It is likely that the Areopagus controlled the accountings of its own
members for unelected official duties. This principle of self-regulation
is evident in the accountings of the bouleutai in classical procedure
and in the fourth-century procedure for investigating charges against
members of the Areopagus, i.e., apophasis 'on initiative' (avT~ 7fPOEAOP.JVT/). For some time after the reform of 487, Areopagites continued to playa prominent role in public affairs as judges and examiners and in other administrative capacities. In these duties members
of the Areopagus were ordinarily accountable only to the Areopagites
themselves, and this in-house procedure served as a guarantee of autonomy.33
Despite the uncertainties, it is generally assumed that the substance
of Ephialtes' reform had to do with the transfer of euthynai from the
Areopagus to the council, the assembly, and the court. It is difficult,
however, to assume that this transfer of jurisdiction would not have
also involved eisangelia for official misconduct. It should be noted
that we have no clear reference to a single case arising from regular
annual accountings in the period before 461, and it is possible that in
this period euthynai and eisangeliai for official misconduct were synonymous: the people held authority to initiate charges against elected
officials during their term of office by apocheirotonia and probole, and
at the end of their term before the euthynoi. Rhodes has argued that
both procedures came to trial before the Areopagus, and we have no
evidence (pace Hansen) to indicate that dikasteria were involved in
political trials before 461.34
32 Aeschin. 1. 106: A0'YtUT~S 'Yf:vop.f:VOS 'lTAf:'UTa p.€V T~V 'lToAtv ;j3Aa"'f: awpa Aap.j3avoov
'lTapa TWV ou aUtatoos ap[avToov, p.aAtUTa a' €UVlCo</>avT71uf: TWV v'lTEv8vvoov TOVS p.."atv ~at1C71lCoTas. Cf Lipsius 107f.

33 On the internal accountings of Areopagites see Carawan 117f; for discussion of
the trial of Themistocles at Ath.Pol. 25.3f, hypo Isoc. 7, and Plut. Arist. 4.3 see infra
197ff with nn.44-50. In fourth-century tradition, cases of official misconduct came
within the special jurisdiction of the Areopagus; cf Ath.Pol. 3.6, 4.4 (atf:T~pf:t Tas
apxas), 8.4 (Ttt p.E'YtuTa TWV 'lTOAtT<tlC>WV atf:T~pH). Isocrates' claim that this supervisory authority extended to broad censorial powers (7.39f) should not be taken too
seriously.
34 Hansen has argued (GRBS 19 [1978] 140-46) that Solon introduced a plurality of
jury courts; and in Eisangelia, in discussing the trials of Miltiades (no. 2) and Cimon
(no. 5), he assumes that the courts already held political jurisdiction; cf Rhodes, JHS
99 (1979) 103f. The notion of regular dokimasiai upon advancement to the
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In regard to euthynai, then, the following specific reforms are indicated: (1) first, with regard to the trial itself, the hearing-in-chief and
final verdict were transferred from the Areopagus to the court of the
people; (2) regarding the examiners, the rule was established that the
euthynoi themselves be held to account for failure to prosecute violations of specific statutes; (3) the logistai were established as a special
committee of the council to review financial accounts; and, perhaps
last of all, (4) the office of the euthynoi was transferred from the
Areopagites to the council. We have little evidence by which to reconstruct the sequence of events, but it is more likely that the trial was
transferred to the people (1) before the reforms with regard to the
accounting officers (2-4). The first reform is likely to be the work of
Ephialtes, and one or more of the later reforms were probably brought
about by Pericles (n';)v 'ApE07raYLTClw lVLa 7rapElAETO, Ath.Pol. 27.1).
The evidence to be considered concerning the trials of Themistocles
and Cimon will shed some light on this problem. First, however, it
will be useful to summarize our findings regarding classical procedure.

(e) Summary
The fundamental division of jurisdiction evident in classical procedure, whereby the assembly directly controlled treason trials and the
council prosecuted official misconduct, seems to derive from a preEphialtic arrangement between the demos and the Areopagus. From
later procedural developments and the limited evidence we have concerning jurisdiction under the Solonian and Cleisthenic politeiai, we
can make the following assumptions regarding pre-Ephialtic procedure.
(1) The decree against Isagoras, the decree of Cannonus, and some
sections of the bouleutic oath suggest that at the end of the Cleisthenic
era, trials for treason and conspiracy were controlled by the demos,
with right of initiative and final verdict. In cases of conspiracy E7rt.
lCaTaA6uEL TOt} a~f.LOV (or Tvpavvlaos), the council held preliminary
investigation and handed down to the assembly their findings for debate and decree for sentence. Solon's law at A th. Pol. 8.4, affirming
Areopagite jurisdiction in impeachments for subversion, may have
been abrogated by the opponents of Isagoras; but it is also possible

Areopagus is much disputed, but it is not unlikely that the regular annual accountings
arose from the frequent, if not regular, challenges to the qualifications of incoming
members as 'confirmation hearings' of the Areopagites; cf Hignett 208.
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that Solon's law only guaranteed to the Areopagus the right to initiate
proceedings and render a preliminary judgment, subject to the verdict
of the people in capital cases.
(2) Cases of deception and corruption involving public officials and
citizens acting in official capacity could also be initiated in the ekklesia by procedures analogous to later apocheirotonia and probole, although such charges against magistrates were ordinarily prosecuted in
the Areopagite accountings. Isocrates supposed that probolai were introduced under the Solonian constitution, and the tradition that
Solon gave the people the power to hold elected officials to account
(Arist. Pol. 2.12.5, 3.11.8) can best be understood as a reference to
these initiating procedures. For such charges it appears to be the rule
that the assembly decreed for trial to be held before a second judicial
body-in the later period the court, in the earlier period the Areopagus. In the era of Areopagite jurisdiction, as in later probolai, it is
also likely that the people, in their preliminary verdict, proposed the
penalty to be assessed if their conviction were upheld.
(3) Charges of official misconduct by eisangelia and euthyna were
ordinarily tried by the Areopagus. Abuse of this authority led to a
series of reforms: the hearing-in-chief and final verdict were transferred to the courts; the initiating procedures were transferred to the
council.
From these observations, the pre-Ephialtic constitution appears to
have been based upon a complex balance of powers. Both the aristocratic council and the popular assembly had available procedures to
initiate legal action against urgent dangers to the state as well as lesser
political offenses; but each body had full jurisdiction in only one of
the two areas. The assembly, with its probouleutic council, had the
authority to initiate proceedings for treason or subversion and carry
those proceedings through to final verdict without reference to the
Areopagus. The council of the ruling class, however, continued to
control public office through the accountings; the fines and other penalties they imposed could not be reversed by appeal to the people; and
if the Areopagites acquitted one of their number out of prejudice, the
demos had little recourse until the reforms of the mid-fifth century.
The surviving testimonia to the major trials of the pre-Ephialtic era
yield many procedural details that have been disputed or disregarded
by scholars who assume the sovereignty of one body or the other, the
people or the Areopagus, in both areas of jurisdiction. Much of this
evidence can now be taken into account and these procedures more
fully described.
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II
(a) The trials ofMiltiades and Phrynichus
In the first decade of the fifth century our sources suggest that the
people had already assumed authority in political trials: three cases in
the years 493-489, the two trials of Miltiades and the judgment
against Phrynichus, are described by Herodotus as tried before the
demos or dikasterion or sentenced by Athenaioi. Hansen includes both
trials of Miltiades in his catalogue of eisangelia to the assembly; and
even Rhodes concedes that Phrynichus was fined by decree of the
people. 35 The evidence is slim, and we should be wary of inferring too
much from so little; but the meaning of the testimony in Herodotusin particular the value of such terms as dikasterion-can be more
clearly defined.
For the first trial of Miltiades we have only a note by Marcellinus to
corroborate the word of Herodotus, and neither author is noted for
precision in constitutional issues:
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In Herodotus the charge is described as TvpavvltJos TfjS fV XEP(1'OV~(1',!>,
but it is not clear on what grounds the hereditary tyranny could have
been an indictable offense. Marcellinus says simply that the prosecutors discussed the tyranny in detail in their arguments; and although
his note seems to be taken directly from Herodotus, it is possible that
his version was influenced by other accounts. His comment, fI'ICA~
/LaTa f7TE«PEPOV S'E,'OVTES T~U TvpauulSa, suggests that the tyranny itself
was not the charge but that Miltiades was held to account for his
35 Hansen (nos. 1-2) 19,69, who does not include the trial of Phrynichus "because
we have no evidence about the procedure or the court hearing the case" (JHS 100
[1980] 91). Rhodes supposes "cases heard by TO a,,(a(J"T~p,oV or {, aijp.o~ may have been
cases which had gone on appeal from one of the archons to the heliaea. This could
have happened in the cases of Phrynichus and Miltiades" (JHS 99 [1979] 105). This
explanation assumes that these trials could have been initiated by graphai doron or
klopes, but such procedures seem to be originally directed against wrongs to individuals, and there is very little evidence that they became important procedures in
prosecutions for the state; cf Harrison II 15f; E. Ruschenbusch, Untersuchungen zur
Geschichte des athenischen Strafrechts (=GrazAbh 4 [1968]) 52f.
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involvement in Athenian affairs during his tenure as hegemon in the
Chersonese. It may have been alleged that he acted in the interests of
the Pisistratids when he took power in the Chersonese with their encouragement (Hdt. 6.39.1), or that he acted against Athenian interests
during Darius' Scythian campaign (6.41.3; cf 4.139). It should be
noted that the charge is not given as prodosias, and the usual meaning
of tyrannidos, 'conspiracy to overthrow the democracy', is nowhere
indicated. These would be the most likely allegations if the procedure
was in fact eisangelia to the assembly as Hansen suggests.
As for the question of jurisdiction, Herodotus tells us that Miltiades
was arrested and prosecuted 'in court', V7TO C3tKaO'T~ptOV; but Herodotus should not be expected to distinguish between the courts of the
people and the ancestral court of the Areopagus. In fact, he uses the
same term of the Spartan gerousia in his account of the trial of
Leotychidas (6.72.2: V7TO atKaO'T~pLoV i17Taxlh{~). 36 By contrast, in his
account of the second trial of Miltiades (infra), Herodotus reports that
he was prosecuted before the people, V7TO TOV OfifJ.0v. Moreover, in
regard to the first trial, it is unlikely that the charges would have been
accepted by the assembly, since strong popular support is indicated in
his election to the generalship for the following year. On balance there
is no reason to suppose that Miltiades was indicted before the assembly or tried before a court of the people in 493/2.
The traditional interpretation, that Miltiades was charged and tried
before the Areopagus, is consistent with the testimony in Herodotus
and is supported by procedural considerations. Herodotus' phrase 1J7TO
aLKaO'T~ptOV a')'a')'ovTE~ EC3{wcav suggests that Miltiades was arrested and
arraigned before the same court in which he was tried, and such a
summary procedure in the courts of the people would be unparalleled.
Miltiades was himself an Areopagite, and it is reasonable to assume
that upon his return to public life at Athens his political adversaries
immediately brought charges in euthynai in the Areopagus. These
procedures, it has been argued, were then entirely controlled by the
Areopagites, without reference to the people. 37
For the second trial of Miltiades (489) Herodotus is again our chief
36 The term /}LKa(J"T~pLoU is used four times in Herodotus, and none of the other
three passages refers to an Athenian court. Two instances refer to the trial of Leotychidas (6.72.2, 6.85.1), which must have been prosecuted by the ephors before the
gerousia; cf Busolt/Swoboda 681, esp. n.6, "Zu einer solchen Verteilung war nur die
Gerusia befugt."
37 See the discussion of euthyna supra, with nn.27-32; cf Carawan 117f. It is now
generally assumed that the younger Miltiades was archon for the year 524/3; cf T. J.
Cadoux, JHS 68 (1948) 110 and n.217, followed by K. Kinzl, Miltiades-Forschungen
(diss. Vienna 1968) 13-15 and, with reference to the opposing arguments, n.21.
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source (6.136.1-3), but here the charges and the procedure are described in greater detail, and the difference in terminology is instructive. Upon his own proposal Miltiades had been given a special command against Paros, but had failed in his mission, and was prosecuted
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Here the procedure is initiated
V7ra Tau afjP.OU, and it appears that the penalty was assessed by vote of
the assembly. The nature of the charges is defined as TijS 'A87Jualoou
a7rctT7Js, which in later procedure corresponds to the grounds for eisangelia against deception and probole, £au ns V7rOCTX0P.(UOS TL Tau afjP.OU
••• E,a7raT~CTTI (Oem. 20.100). As we have seen, probole is said to have
been introduced by Solon as a means of initiating prosecution against
deceptive practices in the ekklesia; and Lipsius suggested that this was
the procedure followed in the second case against Miltiades. 38 In
classical procedure probole led to a hearing before the assembly, and a
preliminary verdict was passed, the penalty was assessed, and the
indictment was handed down to the court for final judgment. Given
the division of authority between the assembly and the court in classical procedure, it is unlikely that in the pre-Ephialtic period the assembly conducted the full proceedings, from preliminary hearing to
final verdict. It is more likely that the people, having debated the
penalty as well as the question of guilt or innocence, handed down
their indictment to a second judicial body; without further evidence
that the courts of the people held jurisdiction in political trials, it is
more reasonable to assume that the Areopagus gave this case its final
hearing. 39
In the case against the dramatist Phrynichus (492) a similar procedure is indicated by the nature of the charges. Herodotus (6.21.2) tells
us that Phrynichus was fined for reminding the Athenians of their
own loss at the fall of Miletus: 7rOL~CTaUn cf>pvulxC!> 8pa.p.a MLA~TOV

38 See the discussion of probole supra, with n.18. Lipsius, however, with most other
commentators assumes that the debate on the penalty inro TOil ~iip.OIl proves that the
final verdict was determined in the assembly or heliaia.
39 The assessment of the penalty at SOT is confirmed by Plut. Cim. 4 and Nep. Milt.
7 (an account independent of Herodotus and possibly derived from Ephorus: cf
FGrHist 70F64). The note in PI. Grg. 516E, that only the vote of the prytanis saved
Miltiades from execution, undoubtedly refers to these proceedings. It may have been
on the initiative of the prytanis that the charges were introduced as a probole for deception rather than eisangelia prodosias, for which the penalty would surely have
been death.
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actionable by probole were included violations in regard to the Dionysia (cf. Oem. 21.11.16f, 76f). How exactly the charges are to be construed is another difficult question. Herodotus cites the case against
Phrynichus as evidence of the close ties and sense of loss felt by the
Athenians for the Milesians, but it is unlikely that the sole grounds of
the prosecution was the feeling that Phrynichus' tragedy was too
disturbing a spectacle; he may have been technically in violation of
the conventions of the Dionysia by introducing contemporary issues,
directly concerning Athenian national interests (olK~La), twenty years
before Aeschylus' Persae; it is likely that his theme was viewed as
provocative and politically motivated. It was probably argued that
Phrynichus and his choregos, Themistoc1es, were inciting the people
to war, and that his demagogic drama was a deception of the people.
The date of the case against Phrynichus has been questioned: traditionally, from the sequence of events in Herodotus' testimony, it has
been assumed that Phrynichus was fined in connection with a production entitled MLA~TOV (lAw ens in the spring of 492. Recently Lenardon
has suggested that the prosecution took place in 476 in connection
with a production of the Phoenician Women, and it was then that
Themistoc1es was choregus.40 But it is not likely that the trilogy of that
year involved an explicit treatment of the fall of Miletus, nor that the
recollection of that disaster would have so moved the Athenians to
bitterness as Herodotus suggests, in an era when the Athenians were
proud of their vengeance. Thus we have no reason to question the
sequence of events in Herodotus. Themistoc1es was the target of this
attack in the year of his archonship (493/2), after the first trial of
Miltiades. Both prosecutions were directed against emerging popular
leaders, and both trials were probably conducted before the Areopagus.
(b) The trials ofHipparch us and Themistocles

The trial of Hipparchus for treason soon after 480 is one of only
two eisangeliai prodosias that can be dated to the period before 461.
Lycurgus 1.117f gives the only direct reference to the procedure: "I7r\
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40 See R. J. Lenardon, The Saga of Themistocles (London 1978) 38, 105f; cf E.
Badian, "Archons and Strategoi," Antichthon 5 (1971) 15f n.44.
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kinsman of the Pisistratids, was the first to be ostracized (in 48817),
and it is often assumed that the chief complaint against Hipparchus
was simply that he refused to return to Athens when the exiles were
recalled during the crisis of 481/0. From the phrase oVX v7Top.€{vavTa
T~V Kp{UtV, however, Hansen assumes that he had returned to Athens
by the amnesty of 481 but went into exile to evade prosecution (and
that is clearly the most obvious meaning of the phrase); thus the trial
should be dated no earlier than 480. We have no specific information
concerning the evidence or the charges, but it is reasonable to assume
that he was accused ofmedism. 41
The case against Themistocles in 467/6 affords many points of comparison with that against Hipparchus. In both, the charges are given
as treason (prodosia or medism); both cases were introduced and
debated before the assembly; and in each case the defendant was convicted in absentia. Hansen has argued convincingly that the Areopagus had no official jurisdiction in these proceedings. A summary
procedure in the ekklesia is indicated by the nature of the charges,
alleging an urgent danger to the state, and by the absence of the
accused, who forfeited the case (fp7Jp.ov TOV o:ywva).
For the treason trial of Themistocles we have many references from
which to reconstruct the initiating and sentencing procedures: from
synchronism with the siege of Naxos (Thuc. 1.137.2) and the death of
Pausanias (1.135.1) the trial has been dated to 467/6. It is clear from
Thucydides' account that he was tried in absentia after his ostracism;
Spartan emissaries revealed, presumably in the ekklesia, that Themistocles was incriminated in the correspondence of Pausanias, and
deputies were sent to arrest him "wherever he could be found." He
was sentenced to death, punished with hereditary atimia, and denied
burial in Attica. The decree for his arrest and execution was included
in the synagoge psephismaton of Craterus; we may therefore presume
that the procedure was eisangelia to the assembly.42 The extreme measures specified in the decree show that the charges were regarded as a
41 Lycurgus refers to a stele recording the decree against Hipparchus and other
prodotai. For the traditional interpretation, that Hipparchus was suspected for refusing to return under amnesty, see G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte IP (Gotha
1895) 661 n. There was some confusion about the identity of this Hipparchus (PA
7600; cf. Davies, APF 451). The MSS. of Lycurgus give the father's name as 'Timarchus' (emended from Harp. s.v. Xapp.os).
42 Lex. Cant. s.v. fi~cra-Y-YfiA,a (=FGrHist 342Fll): ~ Mv n~ fil~ TOVs "IrOAfiP.'OV~ aqwwij-

TaL • . • crvVOP.OAO-Yfil

at

TOlS V"IrO 0fiot/lpacrTov ~ lCaT(x 0fiP.tcrTOICAfOVS filcra-Y-YfiAla, ~v

filcr~-Y-YfiAfiv, W~ KpaT(po~, AfiW~WT7IS ' AAICP.fWVO~.

CARAWAN, EDWIN M., "Eisangelia" and "Euthyna": the Trials of Miltiades, Themistocles, and
Cimon , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 28:2 (1987:Summer) p.167

EDWIN M. CARAWAN

197

matter of the greatest urgency, and we may reasonably conclude that
the issue was decided on the evidence of the Spartan envoys, without
a defense by Themistocles' supporters. We are told that he later wrote
to the Athenians in his own defense, arguing that, as he had been
earlier charged with rebellion, it was not likely he would willingly
submit to the Great King (Plut. Them. 23.3f).
It has been argued that the Areopagites took a role in these proceedings, and that their responsibility for the verdict against Themistocles
was one of the causes of resentment that led to their overthrow. 43
Hansen, however, has shown (to my mind convincingly) that the treason trial was controlled by the ekklesia: the decree for arrest and
execution, without an adequate hearing for the defense, and the extreme penalties specified in the decree show that a summary judgment
was given by the assembly on the evidence of the Spartan envoys
prima facie, without referring the case to a second judicial body (the
Areopagus or the court). Leobotes, the prosecutor named in the decree, cannot be identified as a member of the Areopagus (PA 9071). It
is not unlikely, however, that prominent Areopagites supported the
charges of the Spartan envoys. Thus, although Hansen's view of procedure in eisangelia prodosias is cogent, we cannot dismiss Rhodes'
suggestion that the dominance of the Areopagites in the notorious
political trials of the 460's brought about the reforms of Ephialtes and
Pericles.
There are three references to an earlier trial of Themistocles that
have been discounted: (1) Ath.Pol. 25.3f; (2) Diod. 11.54f; and (3) the
hypothesis to Isocrates' Areopagiticus. 44 The episode in Ath.Pol. 25,
which is usually thought to connect the treason trial of Themistocles
with the reform of 462/1, has thus been rejected on grounds of chronology and legality. Diodorus' brief reference to an earlier trial of
Themistocles, in which he was acquitted, has been disregarded as a
doublet for the later treason trial, in which he was convicted. The
hypothesis to the Areopagiticus has also been rejected as a confused
paraphrase of the Aristotelian account:
43 Rhodes (199-203; cf JHS 99 [1979] 1040 assumes that Solon's law in Ath.Pol.
8.4 has some basis in fact, and that Themistocles was prosecuted by eisangelia to the
Areopagus.
44 The "fable" in Ath.Pol. 25.3f was "firmly disposed of" by Wilamowitz (supra n.4)
140-42; for further references cf G. Sandys, ed., Aristotle's Constitution of Athens 2
(London 1912) 107f; Rhodes 319f. Against P. Ure's suggestion (JHS 41 [1921] 16578) that Themistocles returned from exile in the late 460's (relying on Cic. Fam.
5.17.5) see A. J. Podlecki, The Life of Themistocles (Montreal 1975) 117 n.75. For the
first trial in Diodorus see Lenardon (supra n.40) 113-19; for hypo Isoc. 7 see n.4 7
infra. Reference to an earlier prosecution for embezzlement appears at Pluto Arist. 4.3
(see nn. 49f infra), and Cimon is mentioned among his accusers at 25.7.
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It has been convincingly argued that this episode is a late addendum

to the text, probably derived from a source different from that of the
earlier material in 25.1f.45 Therefore the chronological objection to
connecting this episode with the treason trial of Themistoc1es and the
reform of 462/1 should be reconsidered.
From the procedural details in the episode itself, it is evident that
the scenario belongs to the first phase of Ephialtes' campaign, before
Themistoc1es' ostracism, when he prosecuted individual Areopagites
for official misconduct (25.2: KaL 7TPWTOV /LEV aVf&AfV 7TOAAOV5' TWV ' APfo7TaY'Twv, aywva5' (7T,cplpwv 7TfPL TWV o'~K1]/Llvwv). Although this episode follows the note lP.fAAf oE KplvfCT6a, /L1]O'CT/LOV, nothing in the
episode indicates that these were the charges against Themistoc1es; on
the contrary, the stratagem seems designed to secure appeal to the
people from a procedure that would have been controlled ordinarily
by Themistocles' opponents in the Areopagus. As we have seen, in the
earlier trial of Hipparchus and in the later trial of Themistocles himself, final verdict in eisangelia prodosias was determined by decree in
the ekklesia. The note that Themistoc1es himself was a member of the
Areopagus (25.3) suggests that he faced charges of official misconduct
in the Areopagite accountings, and the hypothesis to Isoc. 7 tends to
confirm that assumption. We have no indication that the people had
gained the right to intervene or hear appeals in the Areopagite accountings before Ephialtes' reform, and thus it is unlikely that Ephialtes could have successfully prosecuted the Areopagites without the
support of a member, such as Themistocles, or without some precedent such as this scenario suggests. The role of the council and assembly in the investigation of conspiracy (7TL KaTaAVCTft Tfj5' 7TOA'Tfla5' is a
convincing detail. We have seen that the council took the initiative in
opposing Isagoras, and the assembly passed a decree against the
conspirators; in later procedure the council and assembly had the
same responsibilities. Thus it is a reasonable conclusion that Themistocles faced charges in the Areopagite accountings, before his ostracism, and, perhaps with the collusion of Ephialtes, secured for himself
4S J. H. Schreiner, SymbOs/o Suppl. 21 (1968) 63-71, attributes 25.1fto Cleidemus,
the episode in 3fto Androtion; see further Carawan 121-23.
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a more favorable hearing before the people by invoking the procedure
against conspiracy.
If the account in Diodorus46 in fact alludes to this episode, it allows
us to date the first trial to the year of Themistocles' ostracism, 47110.
Several details in Diodorus' account tend to disprove the assumption
that his reference to the first trial of Themistocles is a doublet for the
later treason trial. The statement that the Spartans engineered the first
prosecution (for complicity in the plot ofPausanias) may well be Diodorus' own assumption or that of his source, Ephorus. The note that
Themistocles was acquitted in the first trial, again, may simply be his
own inference; but the reference to the earlier trial in connection with
the later proceedings before the Hellenic Congress (55.7f) clearly
indicates that Diodorus had before him an account in which Themistodes was prosecuted in two separate trials, one before the ostracism
and one afterward. Although Diodorus does not mention the second
trial at Athens (and it may be argued, therefore, that the first trial is
simply a mistaken deduction from references to the second), it is
unlikely that he would have dated the trial before Themistocles' ostracism without explicit testimony in his source. Plutarch, in a similar
note, relates that Themistoc1es wrote to the Athenians in his own
defense, making reference to the earlier charges (Them. 23.3f). Thus it
is more likely that Diodorus or Ephorus was using a version of these
events similar to that in Ath.Pol. 25.3f and made the same assumption
that modem commentators have made, that the scenario has something to do with the charges of medism.
The hypothesis to Isocrates' Areopagiticus, however,47 clearly indicates that the proceedings began in financial accountings in the Areopagus and that a result of these proceedings was that the Areopagus
relinquished some measure of their sovereignty. This may mean only
that convictions in the Areopagite accountings were thereafter subject
to appeal or review by the assembly, and that is a likely enough inno46 Diod. 11.54.4f: 8UAEYOVTO [sc. AalCf8atl'0vtot] 8E lCal. TOts fX8pots TOV 0fl'tCTTOICAEOVS,
7rapo!vvOVTfS aVTovs 7rpbS T~V KaTTrYOpLav ••• ov p.~v iiAAa KaT7rYOP7J8Els b 0fP.LCTTOKAfjs
Ton I'EV a7rEt/>VYf T~V TfjS 7rp080CTLas ICpLCTtV • ••• P.fTa 8E TaVTa 0' I'tV t/>0{3'T/8EVns aUTO V
T~V i17rfPOX~V' 0& at 4>8ov~CTaVTfS Tfi aO!!I, TWV p.tV EVfPYfCTLWV E7rEAa8oVTO, T~V a' rCTXVV
,
~
\
\
'"
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~,,~
55 .1: 7rPWTOV
~
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aVTOV Kat TO ."poV'T/I'a Ta7rftVOVV fCT7rfVuOV; C •
I'fV OVV aVTOV fK T'T/S 7rO"fWS
P.ETfCTT7JCTaV, TOVTOV TbV ovop.a(op.fVOV oCTTpaKLCTp.bv hayayoVTES" aVT~ • •.• ; 55.4: 0& at
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KaT'T/yopoVVTES"
TOV~
0fP.LCTTOICAfOVS 8n T~ navCTav{{1KfICOLVWV'T/lCf TfjS 7rpOaOCTtaS.
47 'E4>LaAT7JS ns Kal 0EP.LUTOKAfjs XPEWUTOVVTfS Tfi 7rOAft xp~p.aTa Kal flaDTfs 8n, (aV
atKaCTWULV 0& 'Apf07raytTaL, 7raVTWS a7rOaWCTOVCTL, lCaTaAvuaL aUToh {7rftCTaV T~V 7rOALV,
oilrws oi57rWS nVbs P.EAAOVTOS KpL8fjvat (0 'APLUTOTEA'T/S AEYfL EV Tfi 7rOALTf{~ TWV
, A87JvaLWV lln lCal. 0 0fl'LUTOKAfjS arnos ~V I'~ 7raVTa 8LKa(fLV TOVS 'Apf07raYLTas) 8fj8fV
p.tV, WS at' aVToh TOVTO 7rOLOVVTfS, Tb a' aA'T/8h aLa TOVTO 7raVTa KaTaCTKfva(OVTfs.

f.
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vation in the first phase of Ephialtes' campaign. The assumption that
the hypothesis is a confused paraphrase of Ath.Pol. 25, with Pericles
mistaken for Themistocles, was first put forward by Valentin Rose
before the publication of the London papyrus. Without that document to compare, it was a reasonable assumption, and most commentators have since adopted it despite the discrepancies that show that
the hypothesis does not derive directly from the Ath.Pol.48 The note
that Themistocles and Ephialtes faced prosecution in financial accountings is not likely to be the inference of a sixth-century scholiast
who seems to be otherwise unfamilar with the reforms of Ephialtes
reported in the Ath.Pol..
These three references, then, bear witness that Themistocles was
acquitted by vote of the people in a trial during the year before his
ostracism. The account in Ath.Pol. 25 suggests that he was prosecuted
in the Areopagite accountings, and the hypothesis to Isoc. 7 reveals
that financial misconduct was the charge. As we shall see, a further
reference to the charges against him in Pluto Arist. 4.3 tends to support
this reconstruction. Ordinarily, on such charges punishable by fine,
Themistocles could not appeal to the court of the people. Ephialtes
was in some way implicated, and the Areopagites determined to
initiate conspiracy proceedings, which brought the case before the
council and the assembly. The Areopagites were discredited, and, on
the pattern of the ad hoc procedure in this case, their accountings
were made subject to appeal.
Despite this innovation, however, there is no reason to assume that
the Areopagites would have lost the power to acquit on their own
authority those charged with corruption and official misconduct. It
has been argued that just such a partisan verdict for acquittal in the
'accountings' of Cimon helped to provoke the reform of 4621 1.
(b) The 'accountings' ofAristides and Cimon

Two cases from the decade before Ephialtes' reforms-the trials of
Aristides and Cimon-are described in our sources as 'accountings'
but were probably initiated by eisangelia or pro bole. The account of
embezzlement charges against Aristides EV raL's (V8VVaLS at Pluto Arist.
4.3 is suspect because of the sensationalism of Idomeneus, Plutarch's
source; it is generally ignored in discussions of eisangelia. The infor48 V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus (Leipzig 1863) 423, regarded the hypothesis
as the work of a Christian writer of the sixth century who mistook Pericles for Themistocles. As for the discrepancies, see further in Carawan 123; Schreiner (supra
n.45) suggested that the two accounts, Ath.Pol. 25.3 and the hypothesis, derive from
the same source.
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mation in another account (attributed to Craterus: Arist. 26.1f
FGrHist 342F12), indicating that Aristides was convicted of corruption, fined fifty minas, and died in exile, is rightly rejected by Plutarch
himself, and may well be a doublet for the 'accountings' described at
4.3. 49
In Idomeneus' account (F7) there are numerous significant procedural notes, including the claim that a majority verdict of the people
was reversed by O£ 7rPWTOL Kat {3lAnuTOL:
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Having been appointed 'comptroller of revenues', Aristides prosecuted former archons-Themistoc1es prominent among them-for
embezzlement. In retaliation Themistoc1es roused popular support
for prosecution against Aristides, presumably in the assembly. Evidently a fine was assessed against him, but that sentence was later
reversed.
Much of the terminology and procedural detail probably derives
from Idomeneus. The office of €7rL"J.(A7JT~S TWV o7J#J.O(I'lwv 7rpouoowv is
usually rejected as an anachronism, but we should not discount the
49 The credibility of Idomeneus is doubted precisely because of such stories as this.
It was also Idomeneus who claimed that Pericles plotted the assassination of
Ephialtes (Per. 10.5), a charge that Plutarch rejected on Stesimbrotus' 'testimony' to
Pericles' magnanimity (cj. n.55 infra). On Idomeneus' sources, Theopompus among
them, see Jacoby ad FGrHist 338 (pp.84f), who observed the apparent connection between F7 and Craterus' account of Aristides' death in exile for a fine he could not
pay, and supposed the scenario should be set in 465/4. The two accounts differ, however, as to the author of the charges and the circumstances, Idomeneus indicating
that Themistocles himself was responsible, Craterus naming one Diophantus; Idomeneus claims that Aristides carried out a campaign of prosecution against corruption, presumably before Themistocles' ostracism; Craterus asserts that the arrogance
of the demos after Themistocles' conviction "engendered a throng of sycophants" who
maliciously brought charges against the nobility, Aristides among them. These
discrepancies prevent us from concluding with any confidence that the two accounts
refer to the same trial; if they do, we can be reasonably sure that the two versions do
not derive from the same tradition. Assuming that F7 is a doublet for Craterus F12,
Jacoby remarked (p.88), "Der charakter des berichtes erinnert an das schlechte c. 25
der ' A67f., wo wir die gleiche vemachlassigung der chronologie konstatieren." As we
have seen, however, the sequence of events in Ath.Pol. 25 seems to have some basis in
fact. It is more likely that Craterus' chronology is faulty-indeed, though we have no
reason to discount the trial of Aristides, the story of his death in exile appears to be
no more that a fiction: thus W. Judeich, RE 2 (1896) 883 S.v. "Aristeides."
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testimony that Areopagite examiners, such as Aristides, as E7rLILEA7]Tal
or Ev8vvOL held special authority to prosecute members of the Areopagus for corruption and misconduct in their official duties. 50 The term
E7rLILEA7]T~S may have been misinterpreted by Idomeneus or by Plutarch: the same term is used of 'comptrollers of the tribute' in the later
fifth century, and it is not an unlikely title for such officers in the age
of Aristides. In Craterus F12, moreover, we are told specifically that
Aristides was charged in connection with the tribute assessment.
From the term euthynai we should not assume that Aristides was
charged in regular annual accountings, such as Aristotle describes in
the fourth century; as in the case against Cimon, our sources describe
any prosecution for misconduct in office, whatever the procedure, as
euthynai. 51 The note that Themistocles roused popular support for the
prosecution, (Tvvayaywv 7rOAAOVS, suggests that charges were brought
in the assembly and the fine assessed by vote of the people; but it is
unlikely that the 'outrage of the optimates' would have prevailed
against the verdict of the majority in the ekklesia. Instead, it is likely
in this case, as in the case against Cimon, that the preliminary verdict
of the demos was reversed by the Areopagus.
The trial of Cimon in 463/2 for corruption as strategos, in which
Pericles led the prosecution, is linked to the 'overthrow' of the Areopagus at Ath.Pol. 27,52 and that linkage has led Rhodes to suppose that
the partisan verdict of the Areopagus provoked democratic reform. In
the Ath.Pol. the proceedings are called accountings (euthynai), and it
so The office of epimeietes is first mentioned in an inscription of 425/4 (IG P 68;
MIL 68) regarding the 'comptrollers of the tribute'; cf BusoltlSwoboda 1115. Jacoby
(supra n.49: p.88) insists that the phrase f7t'ILf.>"71T~~ TO>V a7l1L0(T[WV 7tpOITOaWv is
suspicious; he is followed by I. Calabi Limentani, ed., Plutarchi Vita Aristidis
(Florence 1964) 18. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the same term may refer
to supervisors of finance in the early years of the Delian League; and Aristides is
certainly the most likely candidate for such an office in the later 470's, after his
strategiai of 480-477. This solution is all the more tempting in the light of Craterus
F12, where the charges against Aristides are given as W~ 8Tf. TOVS 4>0povs (7tpaTTf. 7tapa
T;;W 'Iwvwv xp,fpoaTa Aa{J/JVTos; for the role of Aristides in the assessment of tribute cf
Ath.Pol. 24.
51 Calabi Limentani (supra n.50) finds the scenario in Arist. 4.4 "incredibile" but
wrongly assumes that "euthynai" before Ephialtes' reforms followed much the same
procedure as classical accountings, with financial audits before the logistai. For other
trials described as euthynai but initiated by eisangelia or related procedures cf.
Hansen 45-49. We cannot be sure that the term katadike derives from Plutarch's
source: Plutarch himself uses the term (as noun or verb) thirty-four times in the Lives,
consistently of fines, as opposed to other judgments; in fact he uses the same phrase,
KaTaalK,[} 7tf.p&J{JaAf.V, in Cat. Mai. 15.2 of the verdict against L. Scipio.
S2 27.1: nEp'KAtovs Kat 7tPWTOV Et,aOK'IL~(TaVTOS 8TE KaT7rYOP7I(Tf. TaS EM-6va~ K'ILWVOS
ITTpaT7I-yovvTO~ v'os cZv, a7llLOnlCwT'pav (n (Tvv'fJ7I -Yf.vt(T8a, T~V 7to>"'Tf.'av. Kat -yap TO>V
, ApE07ta-YiTWV (Via 7tapElAETO.
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is assumed that the Areopagus controlled this procedure before Ephialtes' reforms. Plutarch (Per. 10.5=Cim. 14.4) suggests, however, that
charges against Cimon were initiated in the ekklesia, and on this
evidence Hansen has argued that the assembly handed down an
indictment to the court of the people without reference to the Areopagus. Plutarch suggests that Pericles was elected public prosecutor in
the assembly (10.5: tnfO

TOU

a'ljp.ov 7fpofJ~fJA7JP.'VOS) and that the case

was handed down to the court for trial, 7fpbS Toh aUcaO'"Tas (Cim.
14.3).53 Although Hansen concedes "we cannot be sure that Plutarch
uses the word a'KaO'"T~s in its technical sense," he assumes that the case
was heard before a a'KaO'"T~p,oV, as in later procedure, not before the
Areopagus, as Ath.Pol. implies. The role of Pericles as prosecutor is
confirmed by A th. Pol. , and it is reasonable to assume that charges
were initiated in the assembly, as Plutarch suggests; but a'KaO'"Ta{ may
refer to other judicial bodies, and it is not a necessary conclusion from
Plutarch's remark that the case came to trial before a jury of the
people. 54
53 Cf Pluto Om. 14.3f (=Stesimbr. FGrHist 107F5): amav fUXE OWpOI~ t17TO TOV
fjauIAfw~ , AAEtavopov UVP.'lTE'lTEiu8al, Kat alK1JV ft/>VYE TWV fX8pwv uvuTaVTCllv V'IT' aVTov.
a'IToAoyovp.Evo~ Of 'lTpO~ TOV~ oiKauTa~ OVK ' Iwvwv ft/>1J 'lTpotEVE'iV . . . aAAa AaKEoalP.OVtwv • ... P.V1JU8EL~ OE Tfj~ ICPtUECII~ lICEtV71~ 0 I.T71UtP.fjPOTO~ t/>71uI T~V 'EIC'lTIVtlC71V V'lTEP TOV
Ktp.Cllvo~ OEOP.fV1JV fA8E'iV {'ITt Ta~ 8vpa~ TOV TIEPIKAfov~ (O~TO~ yap ~v TWV KaT1JYopCIIV 0
tTt/>OOPOTaTOS), TOV Of p.EIOIatTaVTa "f"pa13S Et," t/>aval "ypa13s, c!, , EA'lTlvlK1J, 6JS T1JAIKa13Ta
Ola'ITpaTTEU8al 'lTpayp.aTa" 'lTA~V fV yE Til olICl1 'lTp,!-OTaTOV YEVfu8al Tep Klp.CIIVI Kat 'lTpO~ T~V
I
<l nl:'
~
I
"
, ""
I
Per. 10.:
5 EuOKEI
'~I
~,
I
KaT71yopiav
a'IT~ avauT71vai P.OVOV WU'lTEP a."OUIOVP.EVOV.
uE
Kal, 'lTpOTEpOV
~ , EA'lTIVtlC71 Tep Ktp.Cllvi TOV TIEpIICAfa 'lTP,!-OTEPOV 'lTapauXE'iv, gTE T~V 8avaTlIC~v olK71V
ft/>EVYEV. ~v P.Ev yap EIs TWV KaT1JYOpwV (, TIEPIKAfjs V'lTO 1'013 o~p.ov 'lTpofjEfjA71P.fvos.
lA8ovu71~ OE 'lTpO~ aVTov Tij~ , EA'lTIVtlC71~ ICaL OEOP.£V71s P.ElalaUa~ Et'ITEV' ". n 'EA'lTlvlK71,
ypa13s Et . . . 6JS 'lTpayp.aTa T71AIKavTa 'lTpatTUElv." ov p.~v aAAa Kat 'lTpOS TOV AOYOV li.'lTat
aV£UT71 T~V 'lTpofjoA~v at/>OtTIOVP.EVO~, Kat TWV KaT71Yopwv EAaXIuTa TOV Klp.wva AV'IT~uas

a'ITEXWP71uE.
54 Hansen's argument (46,71) depends upon the assumption that a plurality of jury
courts were established before Ephialtes' reform (a point Rhodes disputes: JHS 99
[1979] 105; cf supra n.35) and-a more important point-that they were regularly
given jurisdiction in political trials. On the contrary, whatever the number and
predominance of the dikasteria before Ephialtes, there is no other reference to suggest
that the courts of the people held jurisdiction in political trials except the first trial of
Miltiades, in which, as we have seen, Herodotus uses the term oiKauT~ploV without
regard for its constitutional implications. Similarly, the term dikastai in Plutarchand, for that matter, in other authors as well-does not appear to be used exclusively
of the juries of the popular courts (e.g. Antiph. 1.23, for homicide proceedings ordinarily heard before the Areopagus). Of 153 references to dikastes or dikasterion in
the corpus of Plutarch, nearly half refer to judges or juries other than the Athenian
courts of the people; at least 40 refer to trials at Rome, by no means analogous to the
democratic judiciary at Athens. Moreover, Om. 15.2 implies that the Areopagus controlled dikasteria before Ephialtes' reforms and that the same term would be used to
refer to the court of the Areopagus: or 'lTOAAOt . . . at/>ElAovTo Tij~ l{ 'APElov 'lTayov

fjovAijs TitS KpluEIS 'lTA~V 6AtyCllv a'ITauas, Kat TWV alICauT71plwv KVp{OVS favToVs 'lTOI~UaVTES".
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Plutarch's versions in Per. 10 and Cim. 14 derive in part from Stesimbrotus' On Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles; but it is evident, despite Plutarch's favorable treatment, that Stesimbrotus was
hostile to the democratic reformer. 55 The focus of the episode in Plutarch is Elpinice's plea with Pericles to relent in his attack on Cimon;
and although Pericles turned her away with the insult, "You are an
old woman, too old to carry on such arduous affairs," he nonetheless
prosecuted. the case with restraint, merely fulfilling his obligation to
prosecute in the public interest: T~V 7Tpo{30A~V acpO(TLOvJJ.EVO!l. For Plutarch the episode is proof of Pericles' magnanimity. Elsewhere in Stesimbrotus, however, Pericles treated the family of Cimon with contempt, and he may have allowed the acquittal ofCimon from motives
other than compassion. Despite Plutarch's interpretation, the scenario probably tended to discredit Pericles' reforms.
Plutarch's account of Cimon's defense 7TpO!l TOV!l aLlCaO"Ta!l (Cim.
14.3) does not appear to derive from Stesimbrotus, who is cited for
the Elpinice episode after the note on Cimon's defense; and in Per.
10.5 it is likely that the key phrase V7TO TOt} a~JJ.OV 7TPO{3E{3ATJJJ.fVO!l derives not from Stesimbrotus but from the same tradition that inspired
Ath.Pol. 27f.56
The procedural details in Per. 10.5 are the more plausible as they
are irrelevant to Plutarch's proof of character, and the terms 7Tp0J30A~
and 7TPO{3E{3ATJJJ.fVO!l are not likely to be Plutarch's own choice of wording. The specific procedure (probole) against 'deception' is never mentioned elsewhere in Plutarch, and the version in Cim. 14.4 suggests
that Plutarch regarded 7Tp0J30A~ as a legalistic synonym for KaTTJ'YO-

SS cf K. Meister, Historia 27 (1978) 274-94, who appears to assume that
Stesimbrotus' account of the trial of Cimon showed Pericles' magnanimity (280f,
284), as in Plutarch's version; but the comment at Per. 36.6 (FII), where the appointment of Lacedaemonius to command a token force at Corcyra is taken to indicate
Pericles' contempt for the family of Cimon, probably shows the true tenor of
Stesimbrotus' account. A further insult to Elpinice after the conquest of Samos (Per.
28.5) may also derive from Stesimbrotus (FF8f). Jacoby (ad F5) connects the Elpinice
episode with Pericles' "erotische unmassigkeit," prominent in Stesimbrotus' characterization. For the tradition that Cimon and Pericles were allies in empire-building
see Pluto Mor. 812F; cf Sealey, Essays (supra n.3) 63.
S6 Even in the scant testimony we have, Stesimbrotus' interest in political trials is
evident: in F4 (=Cim. 4.4), giving the details of Miltiades' fine and imprisonment;
and in F3 (=Them. 24.5), our only source for Cimon's prosecution of Epicrates, who
aided Themistocles in his escape. For the case against Cimon, it is not unlikely that
the account in Stesimbrotus was adapted by Theopompus, and the latter historian's
interpretation influenced the author of the Ath.Pol.: cf A. W. Gomme, Historical
Commentary on Thucydides I (Oxford 1945) 47-49; see Connor (supra n.18) 110;
Rhodes (supra n.4) 22f.
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pla. 57 By the procedure described as 7rpO~OA~, prosecutors in the
public interest were nominated and supported by a preliminary verdict of the people; such a procedure is also indicated in Plutarch's
phrase tmo TOV O~IJ.OV 7rPO{3E{3A1JIJ.EVOS. As we have seen, classical7rpo{3oA.q was invoked primarily against false prosecutions and violations
concerning the major festivals, but it is evident that the earlier 7Tp0f30A.q afforded a means of initiating charges in the ekklesia against
'deception of the people'; the second trial of Miltiades, on charges
much like those against Cimon, seems to have followed this procedure. We have no evidence that courts of the people had yet assumed
jurisdiction in political trials of this kind. Instead, the two-stage
procedure in 7TpO{3oA~ appears to derive from the era when the Areopagus held jurisdiction in cases involving official misconduct: charges
were initiated and given a preliminary verdict in the assembly, but the
Areopagus gave final verdict.
Thus the testimonia on the 'accountings' of Aristides and Cimon
suggest that they were indicted in the ekklesia but acquitted by the
Areopagus, and it is a reasonable conclusion that Cimon's acquittal
led to restriction of the Areopagite powers. 58
57 Per. 10.5 is the later of the two versions (cf. c. P. Jones, JRS 56 [1966] 67f);
although it appears to derive substantially from Stesimbrotus, we should not discount
Plutarch's eclectic method in treating episodes for which abundant materials were at
hand. Undoubtedly he relied upon hypomnemata or quoted from memory; cf. O.
Pelling's work on the later Roman lives: JHS 99 (1979) 74-79 and 100 (1980) 12740. Thus it is entirely possible (and I believe quite likely) that the key terms 'lTpofJOA~
and V'lTO TOV a~lLov 'lTpofJf,fJA'T/IL'VOS derive not from Stesimbrotus (whom he cited by
name for the earlier version in Cim. 14) but from Theopompus. The verb 'lTpofJaAAf,u8a, is occasionally used for the nomination of public prosecutors: cf. Dem. 14.4
(=Theopomp. F327). The term 'lTpOfJOA~ is never used elsewhere in Plutarch for legal
proceedings, not even of Demosthenes' suit against Meidias, the most famous
example of this procedure. It is possible that Plutarch interpreted 'lTpofJOA~ as
referring only to the nomination of public prosecutors, and the term need not imply
the specific procedure against 'deception of the people'; but the case against Cimon is
closely parallel to the second trial of Miltiades (supra), in which he was charged with
a'ITch'T/ TOt! a~ILOV, presumably by 'lTpOfJOA~. For my conclusion that Plutarch regarded
'lTpOfJOA~ as a legalistic synonym for ICaT'T/yop{a, see n.53 supra: in Cim. 14.4 we must
either assume that KaT'T/yop{av is the implied object of acfJou'OVILf,VOV, parallel to the
phrase T~V 'lTPOfJOA~V acfJou'OVILf,VOS, or suppose that Plutarch has used the verb transitively in Per. 10.4 but without an object ('to satisfy his conscience') in the parallel
passage in Cim. 14.
58 I have argued in a paper presented at the December 1986 meeting of the
American Philological Association that the one procedural detail identical in both
versions-leaving aside the liaison with Elpinice-is the note that Pericles "rose but
once for the prosecution"; and it is the one point of fact that could have been
disputed in the record of a notorious trial, still within the memory of some among his
audience when Stesimbrotus' work was published. In fact the whole Elpinice episode
may have been invented to discredit this surprising tactic. It is difficult to see how
Pericles could have made his reputation as an advocate of the people in a losing cause
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III
The evolution of the democratic procedure in political trials at
Athens was obviously subject to ideological bias and rhetorical embellishment in the fourth-century tradition, and the contradictions that
arise from that revisionism must be carefully considered in any study
of this kind. No satisfactory solution can be reached by rejecting out
of hand one set of conflicting testimony for another. The references in
Isocrates and Aristotle, which suggest that the sovereignty of the
people in impeachments goes back to the founding of the democracy,
are not sufficient grounds to reject the testimony, in the same tradition, that the Areopagus held specific jurisdiction over the duties of
public officials. Partisan fabrication is all too evident in the tradition
that the Areopagus controlled cases of treason and subversion under
the patrios politeia: I have previously argued (supra n.3) that this view
of the ancestral powers was inspired by the crises of the later fourth
century; and the evidence presented here regarding specific trials of
the early fifth century tends to confirm that conclusion. But it is also
evident from both studies that the tradition of Areopagite jurisdiction
in cases involving the official duties of magistrates has a much more
secure basis. The discrepancies derive in part from the 'open texture'
of Athenian procedural law: the same offense may be indictable by
two or more alternate procedures; the applicability of such charges as
treason, deception, and conspiracy was often open to interpretation.
We have no reason to doubt that the same principle applied in preEphialtic procedure, and no grounds prima Jacie to reject testimony
either that the people held public officials to account or that the
Areopagus controlled impeachments. Much of the contradiction
arises out of the 'double-think' of Athenian popular ideology, by
which the Areopagus, a body whose oligarchic character is revealed
not only in the era before Ephialtes but also in the age of Demosthenes, becomes the "guardian of the democracy."s9
if he refused to speak in rebuttal to Cimon's defense of his Spartan sympathies,
unless he abandoned the case in protest against a partisan jury. As Martin Ostwald
observed, the clause of the bouleutic oath in IG P 105 (supra n.4) may represent an
ancient restriction of the powers of the older council, and he argues that this case
would have come before the assembly for a final vote. I see no contradition, however,
between this guarantee of the people's verdict in capital cases and the procedural
details in Pluto Per. 10.5 (suggesting that the case was initiated before the people and
then tried before a second judicial body) if the death penalty was prescribed in the
people's decree for trial.
S9 For the 'open texture' of Athenian procedural law cf most recently R. Osborne,
JHS 105 (1985) 40-58, esp. 41fregarding Isoc. 15.314, on the availability of alternate
procedures including probole. Concerning the oligarchic character of the Areopagus
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The most trustworthy evidence on the development of procedure
lies not in the generalities posed by fourth-century authors, but in the
record of actual cases. The testimony on eight political trials of the
early fifth century reveals two aspects of pre-Ephialtic procedure that
have not been generally acknowledged.
(1) The evidence concerning the trials of prominent Areopagites,
Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides, tends to confirm rather than
disprove the atthidographic tradition that the Areopagus controlled
impeachments for official misconduct. The account of investigations
in the Areopagus involving Themistocles (Ath.Pol. 25.3; hypo Isoc. 7)
and the role of Aristides in the prosecution of archons and former archons, notably Themistocles (Plut. Arist. 4.3), suggest that cases concerning the official duties of archons and members of the Areopagus
were, before Ephialtes' reforms, ordinarily initiated by Areopagite
examiners and tried within the jurisdiction of the Areopagus, without
appeal to the people. The first trial of Miltiades, "concerning the
tyranny in the Chersonese," may also have been initiated and tried
before the Areopagus.
(2) There were also procedures, analogous to later apocheirotonia
and probole, to initiate prosecution in the ekklesia for deception and
official misconduct. The evidence for the trials of Aristides and Cimon indicates that the demos had the authority to pass sentence
against public officials, but those indicted by the people could still be
acquitted by the Areopagus. The second trial of Miltiades probably
followed similar procedure, although in that case the verdict of the
people was upheld. The curious remark in Gorgias 516 that Miltiades
would have been put to death "if not for the prytany" may indicate
that the presidents of the assembly, who introduced the charge as
a1TcIT7} TOU a~p'ov rather than 1TpoSocrla, thereby saved Miltiades from
the death penalty-though it was but a brief reprieve.
Such proceedings appear to be the basis of Aristotle's judgment that
the demos held public officials to account under the ancestral constitution (A th. Pol. 1274a15, 1281b31). We have no evidence, before the
see further Carawan 117-20, 132-36; for the nature of political groupings before the
rise of Pericles see W. R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens
(Princeton 1971) esp. 25-32. Moreover, the political significance of the reform of 487
(whereby the archons were no longer elected by vote of the people) should be
reconsidered: Badian (supra n.40: 9) regards the usual view, that this reform was a
democratic innovation, as "patent and ignorant nonsense." It is possible that the
archons, afterward members of the Areopagus, were selected by lot only from among
the pentakosiomedimnoi in the 480's or later; cf Pluto Arist. 1. The effect of this
change and of ostracism in the 480's and 470's was to strengthen the coalition of
families and philiai represented in the Areopagus.
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reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles, of regular annual accountings
whereby officials automatically submitted their accounts for examination at the end of their term of office. The strict accountability and
formalized procedures of classical euthynai developed from the democratic reforms of the mid-fifth century.
Prosecutions for treason were ordinarily initiated and tried in the
ekklesia, as the decrees against Hipparchus and Themistocles indicate. The sovereignty of the assembly of the people in such cases
appears to be as old as Cleisthenes' reforms. It is reasonable to assume
that the Areopagus was denied authority to order execution l1.VEv TOt)
a~IJ.OV 7TA:q6voVTOS. The Areopagites may have retained the right to
bring charges of conspiracy to overthrow the democracy (as Ath.Pol.
8.4 and 25.3f suggest), but the democratic council seems to have
borne the responsibility for investigating charges in preliminary hearings from the time ofIsagoras' coup.
Thus the people controlled proceedings against urgent wrongs to
the state, as Lipsius long ago observed. The Areopagus continued to
control proceedings against corruption and misconduct on the part of
public officials, although the demos held right of initiative. This division of jurisdiction is consistent with the development of classical
procedure and what we know of the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles:
the jurisdiction of the Areopagus in 'accountings' and impeachments
for official misconduct was transferred to the council and courts of the
people; the euthynoi themselves were then chosen from among the
bouleutai rather than the Areopagites. Before these reforms the Areopagus, as a council of the ruling class, was virtually autonomous in
its control of public office. That autonomy was made more secure in
the early fifth century by ostracism and the reform of 487, whereby archons and Areopagites were chosen by lot from the highest property
classes, and such activists as Themistocles were no longer elected by
vote of the people. 60
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